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A struggle is underway to preserve the domestic pedigree
of American constitutional law. A number of Justicesconstituting a majority of the current Court-have demonstrated their willingness to treat foreign and international legal
materials as both relevant and persuasive. They have done so,
moreover, in such hotly contested areas of constitutional law as
capital punishment, 1 gay rights, 2 and federalism. 3 Justice

1. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (noting that
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved");
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988) (plurality opinion
of Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (invoking international consensus against execution of juveniles, and reiterating "the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual"); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("'[A]ttention to the judgment
of other nations'. . . can help guide this Court when it decides whether a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment." (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison))); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 99597 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting the "growing
number of courts outside the United States" that have held that lengthy delay
in administering the death penalty can render the ultimate execution "inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel," and observing further that "the Court
has found particularly instructive opinions of former Commonwealth nations
insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our own
Eighth Amendment"). Judging from the questions posed at oral argument and
the amicus briefs that have been filed, the Court's forthcoming decision in
Roper v. Simmons on the execution of juveniles promises more of the same.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ oral-arguments/
argument transcripts/03-633.pdf (Stevens, J.) (questioning whether "[t]he respect of other countries for our country is something we should totally ignore"); id. at 14-15 (Kennedy, J.) (asking whether "world opinion" and "accepted practice in most countries" have any bearing on what constitutes
"unusual" punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes); id. at 16 (Breyer, J.)
(asking whether the Framers "would have thought it was totally irrelevant
what happened elsewhere in the world"); David Stout, Dozens of Nations
Weigh In on Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at A14 (describing
the amicus briefs filed by various nations, diplomats, and former world leaders
in opposition to the execution of juveniles).
2. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (Kennedy, J., joined
by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (citing, inter alia, an advisory
committee report to the British Parliament, and Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981), a decision of the European Court of Human
Rights).
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Breyer is perhaps the Court's most frequent and outspoken
proponent of comparative constitutional analysis; 4 likewise,
Justices O'Connor 5 and Ginsburg 6 have called publicly upon

3. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977-78 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, "relevant political and
structural differences" notwithstanding, European experience with federalism
"may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem").
4. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402-03 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring); Foster, 537 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Printz, 521 U.S. at 977-78
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Stephen Breyer, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Address to the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/public
info/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html ("[Wihat could be more exciting for an academic, practitioner, or judge, than the global legal enterprise that is now upon
us?"); see also Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See Joint Issues With the EU,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24 (quoting Justice Breyer on the desirability of
"cross-fertilization of U.S.-E.U. legal ideas"); Linda Greenhouse, Appealing to
the Law's Brooding Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997, § 4, at 4 (noting the "intrigued" reaction of legal academics to Justice Breyer's use of comparative
constitutional law in his Printz dissent).
5. Justice O'Connor recently attracted attention for a speech given in Atlanta in late 2003 in which she commented: "I suspect that over time we will
rely increasingly, or take notice at least increasingly, on international and foreign courts in examining domestic issues." Bill Rankin, U.S. Justice Is Honored: O'Connor Says Court Has Its Ear to the World, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct.
29, 2003, at A3. Much of the attention was negative. See, e.g., AppropriateRole
of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretationof American Law: Hearing on H.
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. Res. 568]
(opening Statement of Steve Chabot, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution) (quoting Justice O'Connor with disapproval); Danger From Foreign Legal Precedent,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at A20 (same); Mark Steyn,
Gettin' With the Beat, NAT'L REV., Nov. 24, 2003, at 56 (same); Jim Wooten,
Mass. Ruling a Powder Keg, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 23, 2003, at P6 (same).
Justice O'Connor's positive inclinations toward comparative legal analysis are
not new, see Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20-21
("Our flexibility, our ability to borrow ideas from other legal systems, is what
will enable us to remain progressive, with systems that are able to cope with a
rapidly shrinking world."); Greathouse, supra note 4, at A24 (quoting Justice
O'Connor on the increased willingness of the Supreme Court to consult European Court of Justice rulings, and on the need for U.S. judges and lawyers to
learn about European law), and have not always attracted such criticism.
6. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination); Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights
Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 (1999) ("In my view, comparative
analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and
enforcing human rights."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Bor-
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both lawyers and judges to make greater use of foreign legal
materials. Chief Justice Rehnquist has also dabbled in comparative constitutional law 7 and even encouraged other judges
to do the same.8 At other times, however, he has landed in the
company of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 9 who have reacted to
the use of foreign jurisprudence with scorn. 10 "We must never

ders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 329 passim (2004) (reproducing Justice Ginsburg's
speech of August 2, 2003 to the American Constitution Society).
7. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting the degree of controversy engendered in other countries by the issue of physician-assisted suicide); id. at 734 (arguing in light of
the Dutch experience with decriminalized euthanasia that physician-assisted
suicide carries with it a "risk of... abuse" to which legislatures may respond);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (reasoning
that the constitutionally protected sovereign immunity of the states is based
not only upon English common law, but also "the much more fundamental 'jurisprudence in all civilized nations"' (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
17 (1890))); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citing German and Canadian decisions on abortion).
8. See William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-ComparativeRemarks,
in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMANAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411-12 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds.,
1993) ("[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries,
it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process."); Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at viii-ix (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Rehnquist, Foreword] ("I am simply repeating now what
I've said previously: it's time the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of
other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.").
9. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) ("I fail to see... how the
views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide
any support for the Court's ultimate determination.").
10. The depth of their scorn has been most apparent in death penalty
cases. In one instance, Justice Scalia awarded the majority "the Prize for the
Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus"' for daring to invoke, inter alia, "the views of... members of the so-called 'world community."'
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Meanwhile, in their clashes over the constitutionality of lengthy execution delays, Justice Thomas has more than once
taunted Justice Breyer for resorting to foreign jurisprudence. See Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
("Justice Breyer has only added another foreign court to his list while still failing to ground support for his theory in any decision by an American court.");
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) ("[W]ere there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it
would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the European
Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court
of India, or the Privy Council."). One commentator has likened the exchanges
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forget that it is a Constitution for the United States that we are
expounding," warns Justice Scalia; "the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them
to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution."" On questions of federalism, comparative analysis is
simply "inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution."12 In the Eighth Amendment context, "notions of justice"
belonging to the "world community" are "irrelevant" because
they "are (thankfully) not always those of our people."'13 As for
the constitutionality of laws against homosexual conduct, mere
discussion of "foreign views" is not only "meaningless dicta,"
but also "dangerous,"'14 lest the Court "'impose foreign moods,
fads, or fashions on Americans." ' 15 Justice Scalia's battle cry
has not gone unheard. In Congress, bills and resolutions condemning judicial use of foreign law have been introduced; 16
within the Court over the use of foreign legal materials to "a Punch and Judy
show," in which "[j]ust about every time the court cites foreign materials,
Scalia and/or Clarence Thomas dissent." Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should
the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries Think?, SLATE, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2098559 (Apr. 9, 2004). Notwithstanding the disdain
he has often expressed for the use of foreign legal authority, however, Justice
Scalia has himself invoked the practices of "foreign democracies" in dissent.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing the experience of England, Canada, and Australia as evidence that "the prohibition of anonymous campaigning is effective in protecting and enhancing democratic elections" and therefore constitutional).
11. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.).
13. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note
10 (reviewing the reactions of Justices Scalia and Thomas to the use of foreign
jurisprudence in Eighth Amendment cases).
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. Id. (quoting Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
16. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2323, 108th Cong.
§ 201 (2004); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong.
§ 201 (2004); H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong.
(2003); Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong.
(2003). House Resolution 468, for example, singles out Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg by name for criticism. See H.R. Res. 468 at 3-4
(citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J.); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J.); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-96 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); and a speech given by Justice Ginsburg). It further
"reminds the Justices... of the judicial oath they took as a precondition to assuming their responsibilities," and that "the executive and legislative
branches ... are the only branches whose officers are elected by the people."
Id. at 4. Another resolution, dubbed the "Reaffirming American Independence
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some legislators have even called for the impeachment of
judges who impose foreign law upon Americans.17 The barbarians, it would seem, are at the gate.
"We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the
United States that we are expounding": in certain senses, the
warning is meaningless. Surely the members of the Court are
at little risk of mistaking any other document for the Constitution. If the point is instead to emphasize that Americans must
remain masters of their own destiny, no one on the Court has
suggested otherwise. To acknowledge the propriety of comparative analysis hardly entails a surrender of sovereignty. As Justice Breyer has modestly observed:
[T]his Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way
in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to
our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances .... Willingness to consider foreign judicial views in compara-

ble cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a
"decent respect to the opinions of mankind."s

A fairer statement of Justice Scalia's position might be that the
Constitution enshrines a set of uniquely American values and
ideas, and only those values and ideas. But the connections beResolution" by its author and cosponsored by fifty-nine other Republican
members of the House, also singles out recent Supreme Court decisions by
name and warns that "inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judgments,
laws, or pronouncments [sic] threatens the sovereignty of the United States,
the separation of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making
authority." H.R. Res. 568 at 2-3; see also Congressman Tom Feeney, Should
Americans Be Governed By the Laws of Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, or the
European Union?, at http://www.house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004); Wu, supra note 10. The resolution argues, inter alia, that
"Americans should not have to look for guidance on how to live their lives from
the often contradictory decisions of any of hundreds of other foreign organizations." H.R. Res. 568 at 2. It quotes Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz with approval, while citing Lawrence as an example of illicit judicial reliance upon
"the pronouncements of foreign institutions." Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at
921 n.ll, and citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559-60). The Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee has held hearings on the resolution. See Hearingon H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5.
17. See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 42-43 (statement of
Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on the Constitution) (quoting televised remarks of Rep. Tom Feeney, and accusing the resolution's sponsors of engaging in "intimidation" of the judiciary by threatening
impeachment); Conservative Alerts, Tell Supreme Court To Follow Constitution, NOT Europe: Support the "Reaffirmationof American IndependenceResolution", at http://capwiz.com/sicminc/issues/alert/?alertid=5435001&type=CO
(last visited Oct. 8, 2004), cited in Wu, supra note 10.
18. Knight, 528 U.S. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)).
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tween "our" law and "their" law cannot be avoided. The law of
the Constitution is not free of outside influences; nor has it ever
been. And if any of the ideas or values enshrined in the Constitution were ever unique, this nation has endeavored only to
spread them, not to monopolize them. Federal constitutional
law influences, and is influenced by, other bodies of law. It both
presupposes 19 and invokes 20 English common law; it enjoys
complex relationships of reciprocal influence with fifty bodies of
state law; 21 abroad, it influences judges in the reasoned elabo-

ration of legal principles that have in some cases been borrowed
directly from the U.S. Constitution. 22 Cross-border trade in

19. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 188 (1967); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 19-20 (1977); G. Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory:
The Lost Dimension of Marshall Court Sovereignty Cases, in ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 68 (Maeva

Marcus ed., 1992) (quoting the view expressed by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth in his capacity as circuit judge in United States v. Williams, reported in
CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Apr. 30, 1799, that "the common law of England
had become part of the 'laws of the United States' within the meaning of Article III").
20. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, ... the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."); id. amend. V (invoking, but not defining, "liberty," "property," and "due process of law"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 69, 76 (1996) (holding that states enjoy a form of sovereign immunity derived from both "the common law of England" and "'jurisprudence in all civilized nations"' (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890))).
21. See, e.g., Samuel C. Kaplan, "Grab Bag of Principles"or Principled
Grab Bag?: The Constitutionalizationof Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463
passim (1998) (emphasizing the influence of state common law upon federal
constitutional law); Judith S. Kaye, The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partnersin the Protectionof Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS
L.J. 727, 738-52 (1992) (discussing whether state courts should employ common law or constitutional approaches in response to common legal questions,
and whether such approaches should be federal or state in character); Hans A.
Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's
Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 passim (1993) (bemoaning the extent to
which state courts have adopted federal constitutional doctrine as state constitutional law).
22. See, e.g., Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So
Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 415 passim (1999) (describing the postwar imposition of American
constitutional ideals and language upon Japan); P.K. Tripathi, Perspectives on
the American Constitutional Influence on the Constitution of India, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE 72-

89 (Lawrence Ward Beer ed., 1979) (describing Indian borrowing of American
fundamental rights doctrine as "direct and massive").
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constitutional thinking is a reality, 23 and the United States is a
major participant-no less so because some of its judges may
24
prefer to export than to import.
The interconnectedness of federal constitutional law to
other bodies of law illustrates a broader phenomenon of constitutional adjudication. To expound a constitution-any constitution-is to draw upon and contribute to a body of principle,
practice, and precedent that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. Commonalities emerge across jurisdictions because constitutional law develops within a web of reciprocal influences, in
response to shared theoretical and practical challenges. These
commonalities are at points so thick and prominent that the result may fairly be described as generic constitutional law-a
skeletal body of constitutional theory, practice, and doctrine'
that belongs uniquely to no particular jurisdiction. The mere
fact that courts borrow law from one another is unremarkable.
But generic constitutional law exists for more systematic reasons having to do with interlocking relationships of history and
sovereignty, adjudicative methodology, the broad normative
appeal of various rights, and the tensions underlying judicial
review itself. Some have observed, to the contrary, that constitutional law is less likely to be shared than other types of law,
for cultural, social, and nationalistic reasons. 25 Such factors are
23.

See, e.g., The Hon. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dia-

logue: Globalization and the InternationalImpact of the Rehnquist Court, 34
TULSA L.J. 15, 16-27 (1998) (describing the "globalization" of human rights
law, driven in part by increased "dialogue" among judges and courts); AnneMarie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,
192-204 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Global Community] (describing a
"global community of courts" that engages in "constitutional crossfertilization"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L.
L. 1103, 1109-23 (2000) (describing "substantial and growing judicial crossfertilization" in the areas of human rights law and constitutional law).
24. See, e.g., Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 23, at 199 (deeming it historically "unusual" that American courts are "beginning to borrow as
well as to lend"); Mark Tushnet, Returning With Interest: Observations on
Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 325, 325 (1999).
25. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 8 (2d ed. 1993) ("'Societies largely invent their constitutions, their political and administrative systems, even in these days their
economies; but their private law is nearly always taken from others."' (quoting
S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW, at ix
(1969))); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 256, 260 (Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000) (finding "reason to suspect that the phenomenon of preferring indigenous law making for its own sake is especially
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undoubtedly responsible for much divergence, and the force of
sheer nativism should never be underestimated. The fact that
profound dissimilarities and prejudices exist, however, only
makes the phenomenon of generic constitutional law all the
more remarkable.
A search of law journals on Westlaw and LexisNexis reveals very few appearances of the phrase "generic constitutional law," all of them the work of Justice Hans Linde of the
Oregon Supreme Court, who has on occasion used the term as a
mild epithet to criticize the manner in which state judges adopt
federal constitutional formulae in lieu of ascertaining whether
an approach specific to state law might be in order. 26 Even by
itself, the word "generic" already carries unfavorable connotations: it can imply something undifferentiated, substandard,
undistinguished. None of these critical or negative connotations
is intended here. As used here, generic constitutional law is a
descriptive concept, not a normative or evaluative one. Least of
all does it comprise a grand theory of law. The claim that constitutional law across the globe is undergoing a process of teleological convergence is well beyond the scope of the concept. It is
not argued that there exists a "universal natural law" of constitutional democracy27-that certain constitutional principles are
universally true or good, and that it is the task of judges

true in the making of constitutions," and noting the desire "in some political
quarters" to avoid American influence "just because it is American").
26. See Linde, supra note 21, at 942-45 ("[M]ost state courts do not free
themselves from Supreme Court formulas but treat them as generic constitu-

tional law."); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 175 (1984) ("What should a state court do when
faced with a constitutional claim that is phrased in federal terminology and
cites only federal cases, though there could be an equivalent claim under the
state constitution? ...Must constitutional claims be identified by brand, or is
there such a thing as generic constitutional law?"); see also Michael D.
Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of Education
Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 236 n.15 (1998) (quoting Hans A. Linde, Are
State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215, 219-21 (1992));
James L. Oakes, Hans Linde's Constitutionalism,74 OR. L. REV. 1413, 1418
(1995) (quoting INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE HANS
LINDE TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 99 (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995));

John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 231 n.16 (1994) (citing Hans A. Linde, Are State
ConstitutionsCommon Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215, 219 (1992)).
27. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at 40, 42 (opining that the use of foreign law as authority flirts with the "discredited" idea of "universal natural law").
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worldwide to ascertain them. 28 Nor is it argued that constitutional principles-or constitutions themselves-inevitably
serve certain goals that are conducive to human flourishing, 29
though the existence of generic constitutional law may be construed as inconclusive evidence in support of such arguments.
The goal of this Article is instead to explore why, as Justice
Breyer puts it, "[]udges in different countries increasingly apply somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar circumstances." 30 Three explanations are suggested here. First,
constitutional courts experience a common theoretical need to
justify the sometimes countermajoritarian institution of judicial review. This concern, and the stock responses that courts
have developed, amount to a body of generic constitutionaltheory. Second, courts employ common problem-solving skills in
constitutional cases. The use of these skills constitutes what
might be called generic constitutional analysis. Third, courts
face a tangle of overlapping influences, largely not of their own
making, that encourage the adoption of similar legal rules.
These similarities make up a body of generic constitutionaldoctrine. Each will be considered in turn. It is the contention of
this Article that the combination of theory, methodology, and
doctrine amounts to nothing less than generic constitutional
law. In closing, this Article discusses why the idea of generic
28. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The "Necessary"History of Property and
Liberty, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 2, 7-8, 27-28 (2003) (arguing that natural lawyers
identified "certain powerful principles" involving the protection of liberty and
property "to which any conscientious application of constitutional discourse or
doctrine must turn if it is to meet the minimum standards of intellectual coherence and practical common sense"). See generally Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative ConstitutionalInterpretation,74 IND. L.J. 819, 890 (1999) (describing the "universalist"
school of constitutional interpretation and its normative premise that "the
presence of a legal principle in many legal systems is evidence of its truth or
correctness").
29. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 19 (2003)
("[Tihose principles and practices that endure generally do so because they
serve well the communities of which they are a part."); RUSSELL HARDIN,
LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140 (1999) (arguing

that constitutions cannot survive unless they coordinate behavior in a way
that creates opportunities for mutual gain); Epstein, supra note 28, at 7-8,
27-28 (arguing that utility-maximizing legal arrangements that harness "the
best in human nature" have been "intuited and acted upon by justices of all
political persuasions"). See generally Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1238-69 (1999) (offering examples and critiques of "functionalism" in comparative constitutional analysis).
30. Breyer, supra note 4.
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constitutional law should matter to academics, and whether
judges can or should resist its development.
I. GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
A. THE UBIQUITY OF THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DILEMMA
What are the concerns of constitutional theory? Harry Wellington has suggested that the contemporary debate in this
country centers upon a handful of interrelated questions:
[WIhat are the sources of law available to participants in constitutional adjudication? What is a good argument?... What counts as the
justification for a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Constitution? [B]y what right does the Court use a particular interpretive
method? [H]ow are the other branches of government and3 individuals
regulated by the Court to keep the justices in their place? '

There is nothing exclusively American about these questions.
The relative emphasis that they receive may vary from place to
to be in vogue: in
place, along with the answers that happen
32
and originalism 33
interpretivism
example,
for
this country,
enjoy a degree of popularity not observed elsewhere. But the
most fundamental of these theoretical concerns-the one from
which the others derive their urgency - has a generic flavor,
and that concern is the countermajoritarian dilemma. As John
Hart Ely puts it, "the central function... is at the same time
the central problem, of judicial review: a body that is not
elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant
way is telling the people's elected representatives that they
cannot govern as they'd like." 34 Elsewhere as here, interference
31. HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 47 (1990).
32. See David Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 136-37

(1996) (observing that, while most constitutional courts first resolve questions
of textual interpretation then turn to apply principles of rationality and proportionality, the U.S. Supreme Court "typically understands its role as an interpretive one from beginning to end").
33. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 23, at 32-33 ("Originalism, an extremely controversial question in the United States, is usually simply not the
focus, or even a topic, of debate elsewhere.").
34. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-5 (1980); see, e.g.,
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-28, 128 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) ("[S]ome do
and some do not care to recognize a need for keeping the Court's constitutional
interventions within bounds that are imposed, though not clearly defined, by
the theory and practice of political democracy."); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-6, at 302-11 (3d ed. 2000) (observing
that, for decades, "many of the most prominent, and most skillful, constitu-
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by unelected judges with the acts of elected officials is vulnerable to both popular opposition and theoretical criticism.
This tension does not always express itself in the same
conceptual vocabulary. Differences in vocabulary reflect in part
the fact that judges face different points of departure when exploring the limits of their power: some inherit a position of
strength relative to the elected branches, others a position of
weakness. All of these points, however, fall along a single continuum. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has remarked of the proliferation of judicial review over the past half century: "The provisions of the constitutions vary, the structure of the court
systems may differ, but the underlying ideas are the same." 35

Foremost among these ideas is the deceptively simple notion
that "political power should be constrained by law."C All courts

with the power of judicial review struggle to define the implications of this idea, and their struggles inevitably resemble one
another.
Consider the United Kingdom, a country in which the
countermajoritarian dilemma might be supposed not to exist. It
tional theorists [have] treated the question of the legitimacy of judicial review
as itself the central problem of constitutional law," and citing many examples);

Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283 (1957) ("[T]o affirm that the Court
supports minority preferences against majorities is to deny that popular sovereignty and political equality, at least in the traditional sense, exist in the
United States .. ").The tension between judicial review and democracy disappears, of course, if one incorporates judicial review into the very definition
of democracy, as has often been suggested, under the rubric of "constitutional
democracy" or otherwise. See, e.g., ELY, supra, at 73-183 (articulating a "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review under which courts police
and uphold the democratic process); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 23140 (1996 ed.) (arguing that "a democratic constitution is a principled expression in higher law of the political ideal of a people to govern itself in a certain
way," and that a supreme court helps to realize this ideal by employing "public
reason," which citizens and legislators need not always do). Similarly, the tension abates to the extent that the views of the judiciary follow those of the
electorate, whether as a consequence of direct or indirect popular control of
judicial selection or otherwise, or to the extent that courts are simply ineffectual in the face of political opposition. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? passim (1991)

(arguing that courts cannot usually effect social reform without the support of
the elected branches); Dahl, supra,at 284-86 (arguing that, owing to the regularity with which Supreme Court Justices are appointed and the attention
that is given to their views, "the policy views dominant on the Court are never
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States").
35. Rehnquist, Foreword, supra note 8, at vii.
36.

Id.
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is conventional wisdom that, in lieu of a written constitution,
the United Kingdom possesses an unwritten constitutional order premised upon the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
or legislative supremacy. 37 The few known cases in which Eng37. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 23-32, 39-70 (10th ed. 1959) (defining the English "constitution," and identifying parliamentary sovereignty as one of its components);
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY 1 (1999); SIR WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 25-31 (8th ed. 2000).
In recent decades, British efforts to integrate with Europe and to relinquish former colonies have somewhat diluted the meaning of parliamentary
sovereignty. See DICEY, supra note 37, at 65-68. In its traditional form, the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty requires courts not only to uphold whatever Parliament commands, but also to obey the wishes of the current Parliament, regardless of what any past Parliament has done. Id. at 39-40. Because
a past Parliament cannot bind a future Parliament, the courts have normally
adhered to the principle of lex posterior derogatatpriori: an inconsistency between past and present legislation is construed as an implied repeal of the
past legislation. Id. at 65. Legislative entrenchment is supposed to be impossible. Id. at 62-70.
The United Kingdom's membership in the European Union and its adoption of the Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), have strained this principle
and, in the process, strengthened the hand of the judiciary. In enacting the
European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68 (Eng.), Parliament instructed domestic courts to give E.U. law precedence over domestic law, and the courts have
responded by suspending and even striking down parliamentary legislation for
incompatibility with E.U. law. See, e.g., R. v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte
Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 661-65, 676 (H.L.) (speech of Lord
Goff) (granting injunctive relief against enforcement of a fishing vessel registration law); R. v. Sec'y of State for Employment ex parte Equal Opportunities
Comm'n, [1995] 1 A.C. 1, 26-28, 31-32 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Keith) (holding
that a British statute guaranteeing severance pay and compensation for unfair
dismissal discriminated indirectly against female employees, in violation of
E.U. law); Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Development of Human Rights in Britain
Under an Incorporated Convention on Human Rights, 1998 PUB. L. 221, 229.
Judicial review of parliamentary legislation for conformity with E.U. law is
said to be consistent with parliamentary sovereignty for the reason that Parliament itself chose to give E.U. law supremacy over domestic law and is free
to revisit that decision. See P.P. Craig, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 221, 247-49 (1991) (discussing the
opinion of Lord Bridge in Factortame II). Nevertheless, the fact that British
courts may now "disapply" acts of Parliament amounts to a "revolutionary
change" that casts doubt upon the "hallowed rule that Parliament cannot bind
its successors." WADE & FORSYTH, supra, at 28. One way to reconcile the Act
with the notion of parliamentary sovereignty might be to insist that the Act
merely imposes formal and procedural requirements that do not detract from
the substantive core of parliamentary sovereignty: on this view, subsequent
Parliaments remain free to repudiate the Act and E.U. law but must do so in
an explicit and unambiguous manner, lest the United Kingdom run the continual risk of inadvertently repudiating European law whenever a new statute
is enacted. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra, at 15, 244-45. However, this solution
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lish judges have claimed the ability to strike down legislation
are several centuries old. 38 In particular, Chief Justice Coke's

opinion in Bonham's Case39 has sometimes been read as asserting a power on the part of judges to "controul Acts of Parliament"40 that are contrary to natural law. 4 1 But whatever Coke

places the courts in the position of deciding whether and how Parliament may
reclaim the power it has ceded to the European Union. Even if Parliament
were explicitly to state its intent to depart from E.U. law in a particular context, "the courts might follow the national statute, but they might also state
that this form of 'partial compliance' with [E.U.] law is not possible; that while
the U.K. remains in the [European Union] it cannot pick and choose which
norms of [E.U.] law to comply with." Craig, supra, at 253. At the extreme, parliamentary sovereignty might fall victim to the passage of time "if it ever
comes to be generally accepted by British legal officials that Parliament has
lost its authority to withdraw Britain from the European Community."
GOLDSWORTHY, supra,at 244.

The Human Rights Act, 1998, in turn, is the means by which the United
Kingdom has chosen to incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law. See Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, Human Rights
and the British Constitution, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 100 (Jeffrey
Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 4th ed. 2000). Unlike the European Communities
Act, 1972, the Human Rights Act does not empower judges to strike down parliamentary legislation. See id. at 101. Instead, it directs judges either to interpret challenged legislation in a manner consistent with the Convention or, if
that is not possible, to issue a nonbinding "declaration of incompatibility" upon
which it is in Parliament's sole discretion whether to act. See id. at 101-02. If
Parliament does not respond to a domestic ruling with appropriate amending
legislation, however, the result is likely to be an adverse ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that binds the United Kingdom as a signatory to
the Convention. See, e.g., Lord Irvine, supra, at 225-29; Lord Lester, supra, at
105; Geoffrey Marshall, The United Kingdom Human Rights Act, 1998, in
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at

108-114 (criticizing the Act on the grounds that it fails, both in theory and in
practice, to incorporate the Convention into British law).
In theory, parliamentary sovereignty also prevents Parliament from ridding itself of legislative power over former British colonies that wish to gain
their independence by peaceful and legal means. It calls into question, for example, the validity of section 2 of the Canada Act, 1982, by which Parliament
purported to renounce any further legislative power over Canada. See PETER
W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, § 3.5(d), at 3-11 to 3-13 (3d ed.
2003) (discussing section 2 of the Canada Act, 1982 and its questionable legality as a matter of British constitutional law); see also GOLDSWORTHY, supra, at
244 (discussing the same problem as raised by the Australia Act 1986).
38. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and
Practice of Wednesbury Review, 1996 PUB. L. 59, 61 (discussing Bonham's
Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610), and Day v. Savadge, Hob.
85, 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B. 1614)).
39. 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
40. Id. at 652.
41. See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 37, at 6 & n.34 (documenting this
view, and deeming it a "historical myth[]"); David Jenkins, From Unwritten to
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may have originally intended, the interpretation that has since
prevailed is that Bonham's Case merely establishes a rule of
statutory construction. 42 Indeed, Coke himself offered this interpretation in later years. 43 It is natural to think, moreover,
that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 resolved any lingering
doubts in favor of Parliament. 44 In short, Bonham's Case is no
45
Marbury v. Madison.
In fact, there exists a thriving debate in the United Kingdom over the normative foundations and proper extent of judicial review. 46 A detour into English administrative law is necWritten: Transformationin the British Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 884-89, 958 (2003) (noting that "subsequent interpretations, or misinterpretations," of Bonham's Case have "asserted the primacy of
higher legal principles over contrary acts of Parliament"). Coke soon thereafter
repeated his suggestion that judges might strike down statutes on the basis of
the common law. Id. at 888 n.189 (discussing Rowles v. Mason, 2 Brownl. &
Golds. 192, 198, 123 Eng. Rep. 892, 895 (C.P. 1612)).
42. See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 37, at 6 & n.34; Lord Irvine, supra note 38, at 61; Jenkins, supra note 41, at 887-88; cf. Paul Craig, Public
Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory, 2000 PUB. L. 211, 213 ("[M]any contend that Coke was arguing for no more than a strong rule of construction,
rather than a power to invalidate as such.").
43. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in ComparativePerspective: Constitutionalismin Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001).
44. See id. at 4; Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 90.
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803) (establishing the power of the
federal judiciary to invalidate legislation on constitutional grounds). The English judiciary has, however, demonstrated that the power of interpretation
may be used so aggressively as to nullify statutory language. The well known
Anisminic case concerned the ability of the judiciary to review the decisions of
a commission charged with deciding claims for compensation respecting property seized by the Egyptian government in the prelude to the Suez Crisis. See
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 169-75
(H.L.). In blunt and unambiguous terms, the relevant statute precluded all
judicial review of the commission's decisions: "The determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called into
question in any court of law." Id. at 169-75 (speech of Lord Reid). Inevitably, a
disappointed claimant sought judicial review of the commission's decision. See
id. The House of Lords, in its capacity as the nation's highest court, did not
purport to strike down the language in question, but instead manipulated the
distinction between jurisdictional error and legal error to read the ouster
clause into oblivion. See id.; id. at 206-10 (speech of Lord Wilberforce); see also
J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 106-08 (5th ed. 1997) (observing that Anisminic "shows how, on occasion, the courts will resist the
strongest efforts of the government to exclude them from reviewing executive
discretion"); The Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf of Barnes, Droit Public-English Style,
1995 PUB. L. 57, 69 (noting with satisfaction that Parliament has not since
dared to enact similar language).
46. See Paul Craig, Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review,
57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 63 passim (1998) (providing an overview of the debate);
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essary to illustrate the origins of the debate-though, as will
become apparent, no firm distinction can be drawn in the
United Kingdom between administrative and constitutional
law. In the United Kingdom as in the United States, it is routine for judges to review the substance of administrative action.
In the United States, such review ordinarily occurs at the federal level under the comprehensive scheme established by the
47
and thus requires no special
Administrative Procedure Act

normative justification. English judges, however, lack such a
general statutory warrant, and the standards they apply are of
their own creation. In the absence of an express statutory mandate, the question therefore arises: what is the justification for
administrative review?
The conventional justification is the so-called ultra vires
doctrine. The argument is a simple one. It is the role of the
courts to police the adherence of executive action to its legislative bounds. To this uncontroversial premise, the English
courts add a variety of assumptions as to legislative intent. One
particular assumption-the proverbial nose of the camel under
the tent-enables them to review the substance of executive action: when the legislature confers discretion upon the executive,
it is presumed to intend that the discretion be exercised reasonably.4 8 Champions of the ultra vires doctrine deem it decisive that the doctrine is consistent with parliamentary sovereignty: because parliamentary sovereignty is a fact of the
unwritten constitution-indeed, the touchstone of legitimacyconformity to parliamentary sovereignty is the sine qua non of
any theory of judicial review. 49 On this view, even if it is a legal
fiction on the part of judges to impute an entire body of procedural and substantive requirements to legislative intent, the

Craig, supra note 42, at 231 & n.4 (canvassing prominent literature on both

sides).
47.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2004).

48. The relevant standard of review is phrased in highly deferential terms
and is known as Wednesbury review, named for the decision in Associated Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [19481 1 K.B. 223. See DAVID
ROBERTSON, JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 238-62 (1998)
(discussing Wednesbury review and its variants); infra notes 235-42 and accompanying text (describing Wednesbury review, and contrasting it with the
more stringent proportionality review of the kind common elsewhere in
Europe).
49. See Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra
Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review, 55
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122, 136-37 (1996).
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fiction is a useful and indispensable one. 50 It dictates, however,
that courts are powerless to strike down legislation openly.5 1
Others criticize the ultra vires doctrine as a malign fiction
from which the courts must liberate themselves if they are to
fulfill their true role in the constitutional order. 52 These critics-a number of prominent judges among them-emphasize
that the courts are in truth engaged in the enforcement of substantive legal norms, notwithstanding the intent of Parliament,
and have been at this task for centuries. 53 The legitimacy of
this enterprise, they argue, rests upon the normative force of
the legal principles themselves. 54 It is a logical extension of the
argument to insist that some principles are so compelling that
neither the executive nor the legislature may override them.
Indeed, on this view, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty is
itself contingent upon adequate normative justification. 55 In the
words of High Court Judge Sir John Laws, the absence of a
''sovereign text" means that "the legal distribution of public

50. See, e.g., id. at 136 ("No one is so innocent as to suppose that judicial
creativity does not form the grounds of judicial review; but by adhering to the
doctrine of ultra vires the judiciary shows that it adheres to its proper constitutional position .. "); Mark Elliott, The Ultra Vires Doctrine In a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law, 58
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 129, 134-58 (1999) (acknowledging "shortcomings" of "traditional" ultra vires doctrine, but urging a "modified version" based upon the
"rule of law" in lieu of "taking the constitutionally unacceptable step of challenging the sovereignty of Parliament").
51. See Forsyth, supra note 49, at 140.
52. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 42, at 231-37; The Hon. Sir John Laws,
Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72, 78-79 & 79 n.23; Lord Woolf, supra note
45, at 65-69 (likening the ultra vires doctrine to a "fairy tale," and arguing
that courts need not uphold legislation that undermines or destroys the "rule
of law").
53. See, e.g., Lord Woolf, supra note 45, at 65-69.
54. See, e.g., Craig supra note 42, at 231.
55. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 46, at 86-90 (arguing that judicial review
"can only be legitimated ... by asking whether there is a reasoned justification which is acceptable in normative terms"); Craig, supra note 42, at 230
(arguing for the view that "Parliament has sovereign power, provided that
there is the requisite normative justification for that power"); Laws, supra
note 52, at 87 ("[T]he doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty cannot be vouched
by Parliamentary legislation; a higher-order law confers it, and must of necessity limit it."); The Hon. Sir Stephen Sedley, Human Rights: A Twenty-First
Century Agenda, 1995 PUB. L. 386, 389-91 (describing a "new and still emerging constitutional paradigm" of "i-polar sovereignty" and "fundamental human rights" predicated upon "shared perceptions" of society's needs); Lord
Woolf, supra note 45, at 67-69 (arguing that parliamentary sovereignty must
yield to the "rule of law," upon which "parliamentary democracy" is premised).
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power consists ultimately in a dynamic settlement, acceptable
56
to the people, between the different arms of government."
There is a "clear parallel," as Lord Irvine has observed,
"between the ongoing debate in America about the powers of
the courts in relation to the Constitution, and the discourse in
Britain concerning the desirability of parliamentary sovereignty."5 7 The difference is one of vocabulary and degree, not
kind. At the heart of both debates lie the same questions: "How
much power should the courts have over the other branches of
government? And in what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for the judicial branch to overrule elected legislators and
administrators in order to safeguard individual or group interests?"58 Indeed, the example of the United Kingdom suggests a
broader point: if a country with no written constitution and a
tradition of legislative supremacy nevertheless generates debate over the extent to which judges can and should invalidate
legislation, such conflict may be expected in other countries as
59
well.
B. Two APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER
The debate in the United Kingdom highlights not only the
core challenge of generic constitutional theory-namely, the articulation and justification of the limits of judicial power-but
also the two basic approaches that may be adopted in response.
The first may be called the hierarchy of laws approach, the second the core interests approach. Under the hierarchy of laws
approach, legal rules fall within categories-constitutional, legislative, or judicial-according to their formal status or origin.
These categories constitute a simple hierarchy that, if observed,
keeps both judicial and legislative power within the limits of
legitimacy: constitutional law trumps legislation, which in turn
trumps judge-made or common law. In the event of conflict between two legal rules, one need only determine the nature of

56. Laws, supra note 52, at 81.
57. Lord Irvine, supra note 43, at 6.
58. Id.
59. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality,"Rights and
Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 599 (1999) (comparing Canada and the
United States) (noting that "issues of the legitimacy and the scope of judicial
activism and of deference to legislative judgments can emerge early even in
new constitutional systems").
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the relevant rules-constitutional, legislative, or judicial-to
know which rule, and which branch of government, prevails.6 0
60. The executive branch and administrative agencies are obviously an
important source of law as well, but their position in the hierarchy is hardly
enviable: in theory and in practice, administrative lawmaking is subject to
both constitutional and legislative restraints, as defined and enforced by the
judiciary. Administrative law possesses, at best, the force of legislation and, at
worst, no legal force at all, depending upon the extent to which the judiciary
decides that the legislature has delegated lawmaking authority. Moreover, in
the inevitable absence of precise statutory standards to guide judicial review
of agency action, administrative law tends in practice to amount to a body of
judge-made law, as illustrated by the British example. See supra text accompanying note 48 (discussing how British courts have fashioned principles of
administrative law using the fiction of legislative intent). For these reasons,
the position of administrative law within the hierarchy is very much within
the control of the judiciary.
Courts control the scope of agency decision making in two steps, both of
which entail the exercise of considerable judicial discretion. First, they determine the extent of the agency's discretion by interpreting the relevant statute.
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (requiring reviewing courts to defer to "reasonable" agency interpretations of governing statutes if Congress has not "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue," but begging the question of what constitutes a "reasonable" interpretation). Second, they determine whether the agency has remained within the (judicially defined) limits of its discretion. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2004) (directing courts to set aside
"agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). In France, for
example, administrative judges are very reluctant to find that the executive
enjoys absolute discretion. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 254, 257 (5th ed. 1998). To a greater extent than might
be expected in the United States or United Kingdom, French administrative
courts are apt to conclude that the administration possesses no discretion
whatsoever, and to substitute their own judgment for that of the administration. See, e.g., Soci6t6 Civile Sainte-Marie de l'Assomption, Conseil d'Etat, Oct.
20, 1972, Lebon 657, concl. Morisot, discussed in Sophie Boyron, Proportionality in English Administrative Law: A Faulty Translation?, 12 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 237, 248 (1992) (assessing, de novo, whether and to what extent
construction of a major motorway could infringe upon the grounds of a mental
hospital, and ultimately authorizing the expropriation of a building, but not
the construction of a road junction); Dame Ebri et Union Syndicale de Defense
des propri~taires du Massif de la Clape, Conseil d'ttat, May 2, 1975, A.J.D.A.
1975, concl. Guillaume, 311, discussed in Boyron, supra, at 242 (deciding, de
novo, whether eight hectares of land constituted a "picturesque site" that could
not be modified without special authorization); Gomel, Conseil d'ttat, Apr. 4,
1914, Lebon 488, discussed in BROWN & BELL, supra, at 258 (deciding, de
novo, whether there existed a view of "architectural value" that justified building restrictions). In intermediate situations, when the administration enjoys
limited discretion, the courts will visit the merits of agency decision making
under an "erreurmanifeste" standard, BROWN & BELL, supra, at 256-58, that
is reminiscent, at least in language, of the "arbitrary or capricious" standard
imposed in this country by section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2004). Even when a matter has been committed wholly to
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This hierarchical sorting approach is implicit among the champions of parliamentary sovereignty, for whom the legislative
pedigree of a rule is enough to establish its dominance over any
common law rule, however ancient the latter may be. In the
same vein, it is well established in this country that legislation
must yield to the Constitution.
Under the core interests approach, by contrast, courts resolve interbranch conflict by looking not to the origin of legal
rules, but to their substantive content. Interests that are seen
as intrinsically deserving of judicial protection are given such
protection. The authorship or pedigree of the legal rules purporting to uphold or restrict those interests may be relevant
but need not be decisive. In the United Kingdom, for example,
this approach is exemplified by those who argue that the courts
possess the power to review legislation for consistency with
fundamental legal principles, notwithstanding the absence of a
written constitution. 61 The core interests to be protected may be
those of the governed, or those of the branches themselves,
though judges have an incentive to blur the distinction when
their own interests are at stake. Courts have equated their own
interests with those of the people by arguing, for instance, that
a strong judiciary is required to vindicate the rights of individuals, 62 or the rule of law, 63 or democracy itself. 64 These arthe discretion of the executive, however, the administrative courts will ensure
that the administration has "committed no mistake of law or fact," and has
acted for a proper purpose. BROWN & BELL, supra, at 254 (citing the doctrinal
rule against ditournement de pouvoir). The fact that the judiciary exercises
control over administrative decision making in two stages can make judicial
supervision especially difficult to restrict. Courts can manipulate the distinction between the two stages to their own advantage: if the legislature does not
permit the courts to review how an agency has exercised its discretion, the
courts may nevertheless strike at what the agency has done simply by narrowing the limits of the agency's discretion. See, e.g., Bromley London Borough
Council v. Greater London Council, [1983] 1 A.C. 768, 814-20, 823-30, 843-46
(H.L.) (U.K.) (speeches of Lords Wilberforce, Diplock, and Scarman) (holding
that the meaning of the word "economic" in the governing statute precluded
London public transit authorities from reducing fares and generating a revenue shortfall, to be recovered via surcharges upon local governments); supra
note 45 (discussing Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Comp. Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C.
147 (H.L) (U.K.)); see also PAUL P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 818 (4th ed.
1999) (contrasting the British judiciary's "jurisdictional control" over agency
action with its power to review such action for "error within jurisdiction").
61. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing the views
held by critics of the ultra vires model of judicial review).
62. See, e.g., The Hon. Sir John Laws, Is the High Court the Guardian of
Fundamental ConstitutionalRights?, 1993 PUB. L. 59, 69-79 (arguing that the
judiciary must scrutinize governmental action more closely when "fundamen-
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guments are unsurprising insofar as they make judicial assertions of power appear normatively desirable rather than selfserving. Nevertheless, the core interests approach exposes constitutional courts to attack both for the blatantly countermajoritarian way in which it settles the countermajoritarian dilemma, and for the subjectivity inherent in any judicial effort to
select and prioritize interests for protection. Judges may seek
to downplay the subjective element of this approach by insisting, for example, that they are constrained in their determinations by history and tradition 5 or text, 66 or that they will
choose only the most incontrovertibly cherished interests for
tal rights" are implicated); Note, Executive Revision of JudicialDecisions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2026-27 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
and does invoke the separation of powers to defend its ability to vindicate the
rights of individual litigants).
63. See, e.g., Lord Woolf, supra note 45, at 68-69 (commending Anisminic's refusal to respect jurisdiction-stripping legislation as an example of
the judiciary taking a rare stand in defense of the rule of law).
64. See, e.g., Laws, supra note 52, at 81, 84-91; Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 566, 568-69 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires apportionment of state legislatures on a population basis and stating,
"We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and
mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no
less of us.").
65. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) ("We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices."); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (remarking that limits on substantive due process come from "respect
for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society" (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring))); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (observing that the Due Process Clause protects those rights "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.))).
66. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (objecting to
the tactic of "diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right" by
"substitut[ing] for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning"'); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 176-77 (Black, J., concurring) (preferring the judicial enforcement of "express constitutional guarantees" to the "accordion-like"
quality of substantive due process analysis); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23-29, 37-41 (1997) (arguing for textualism in constitutional interpretation). Indeed, even the fact that
the text imposes too little constraint can be construed as a constraint. See
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (holding that the word "try"
in the Impeachment Clause lacks "sufficient precision to afford any judicially
manageable standard of review," and that the claim that the Senate had failed
to "try" an impeachment because it had not provided a full evidentiary hearing
was therefore nonjusticiable).
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protection.6 7 At root, however, the core interests approach invites judges to define the extent of their own power on the basis
of their own value judgments.
C. THE INDETERMINACY OF THE HIERARCHY OF LAWS
This is not to suggest that the hierarchy of laws approach
relieves judges of the obligation-or the opportunity-to define
the limits of their power. Legal rules and principles may not be
fixedly constitutional, legislative, or judge-made in character.
Because they decide where in the hierarchy particular legal
rules and principles belong, judges can effectively manipulate
the hierarchy to suit their own ends. The distinction between
judge-made law and legislation, for example, might seem to
leave relatively little room for doubt. Unlike constitutional law
and common law, which are both announced by judges, legislation and judge-made law might at least be distinguished on the
basis of authorship. In practice, however, authorship is a vexed
question. In the United Kingdom, the courts have employed the
device of legislative intent to read into legislation a body of
judge-made law that is then used to strike down administrative
action. 68 In effect, the judiciary has claimed power over the executive in the name of the legislature. Similarly, though judicial review of administrative action in the United States enjoys
a legislative touchstone of legitimacy in the form of the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 the looseness of its operative terms
has required judges to articulate the actual body of law under
which they strike down executive action.70 More broadly,

67. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (observing that the Due
Process Clause only protects "those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, ... 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed"' (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937))); Lord Woolf, supra note 45, at 6869 (arguing that Parliament cannot repudiate the "rule of law," such as by
"removing or substantially impairing the entire reviewing role of the High
Court"); The Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Cooke, Fundamentals,1988 N.Z. L.J. 158, 164
(arguing that judges should strike down laws that undermine either "the operation of a democratic legislature" or "the operation of independent courts").
68. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2004).
70. Compare id. § 706(2) (directing courts to set aside "agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law"), with, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1983) (attempting to
elaborate the meaning of "arbitrary" and "capricious"), and Nat'l Lime Ass'n v.
EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (describing the evolution of
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American legislatures have blurred the distinction between
statutory and judge-made law by systematically codifying the
rules of the common law. 7 1 As Grant Gilmore observes, it was

once a hallmark of American legal formalism to posit a sharp
hierarchical distinction between the judicial and legislative
functions: "Only the legislature could change the rules; when
the legislature had spoken, the courts were bound to carry out
the legislative command." 72 Over the last century, however,
"[w]e have come to see that such a distinction is not, and never
73
was, tenable."
The relationship between legislation and constitutional law
is also fraught with ambiguity. In some cases, the categories
overlap; in others, they may be synonymous. It is routine to observe that Britain's unwritten "constitution" includes statutes
old and new, 74 from the Habeas Corpus Acts of 164075 and
167976 and the Act of Settlement, 170177 to the European
Communities Act, 1972 and the Human Rights Act, 1998.78 By

comparison, Canada has a written constitution, but that constitution is itself an act of legislation that confers constitutional
status upon a host of other legislation: the Constitution Act,
1982 defines the "Constitution of Canada" as including an entire schedule of statutes both British and Canadian in origin. 79
Constitutional law often influences the meaning of legislation:
by law, British courts must read legislation to be compatible
with the European Convention on Human Rights "[s]o far as it

"hard look" review).
71. See GILMORE, supra note 19, at 15.
72. Id. at 14-15.
73.

Id.

74.

See, e.g., DICEY, supra note 37, at 6-7 (noting that there exists no "test

by which to discriminate laws which are constitutional or fundamental from
ordinary enactments"); RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI & WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., THE
BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 7-18 (1993) (listing "a number of

important documents" that, together with certain "constitutional conventions"
and common law principles, "might well be referred to as the British constitution").
75. 16 Car. 1, c. 10.
76. 31 Car. 2, c. 2.
77. 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2.
78. See supra note 37 (discussing the European Communities Act, 1972,
the Human Rights Act, 1998, and their consequences for judicial review in the
United Kingdom).
79. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VII, § 52(2) & sched.;
HOGG, supra note 37, §§ 1.2-1.6, at 1-1 to 1-10.
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is possible to do so,"8 0 while the U.S. Supreme Court has gone
to extremes to construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional
questions. 8 ' But the reverse is also true: legislation can sometimes affect the content of constitutional law. In this country,
for example, the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress
may not use its enforcement powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment 8 2 to effect "substantive change" in constitutional law, yet by the Court's own admission, the line between congressional enforcement and substantive constitutional law "is not easy to discern."83 In other cases, the Court
has fashioned constitutional standards that rest upon the content of ordinary legislation.8 4 More generally, it can be argued
that certain landmark statutes-what William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn call "super-statutes"--occupy "the legal terrain
once called 'fundamental law"'; the prominence of such statutes, and their influence upon the evolution of constitutional
law itself, may be said to imbue them with "quasiconstitutional" status.8 5 In both their substance and their ob-

80. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (Eng.).
81. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-70 (1991) (applying a
"plain statement rule" of statutory interpretation to federal age discrimination
legislation in order to avoid questions concerning the scope of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-14 & 301 n.13 (2001) (declining to
address the scope of the Suspension Clause absent "clear, unambiguous, and
express statement of congressional intent" to preclude habeas review of legal
questions).
82. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
83. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
84. Consider City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), in
which the Court held that state and local governments may not engage in affirmative action absent a "prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation" that is to be remedied. Id. at 500. In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized
the majority's adoption of a constitutional standard predicated upon the content of civil rights legislation:
If Congress tomorrow dramatically expanded Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 . . . -or alternatively, if it repealed that legislation
altogether-the meaning of equal protection would change precipitately along with it. Whatever the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had in mind in 1868, it certainly was not that the content of their Amendment would turn on the amendments to or the
evolving interpretations of a federal statute passed nearly a century
later.
Id. at 556 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE
L.J. 1215, 1216-17, 1275-76 (2001).
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jects of concern, laws such as the Civil Rights Act of 196486 and
the Administrative Procedure Act might be considered the
functional equivalent of constitutional law over8 7which judges
and legislators alike exert some degree of control.
The distinction between constitutional law and judge-made
law is, however, the most obvious and promising candidate for
self-interested judicial manipulation. Even in theory, it is unclear how constitutional law and mere judge-made law may be
distinguished. No written constitution is complete unto itself.
Like any legal document, a constitution inevitably presupposes
some background body of understandings that gives meaning to
its terms, and to which it may even refer explicitly. The choice
and use of these background understandings is left to judges.
Such is clearly the case with the U.S. Constitution, for example, which invokes "the rules of the common law"8 8 and manages in the space of a single sentence to deploy such concepts as
"liberty," "property," and "due process."8 9 Similarly, the Canadian Constitution includes both common law principles and
constitutional "conventions" based upon custom and tradition; 90
though mere "conventions" are said to be judicially unenforceable, 91 the Canadian Supreme Court does enforce "unwritten
constitutional principles,"9 2 and the line between enforceable
and unenforceable constitutional law is itself for judges to
draw. Constitutional law is the product of judicial choiceconstrained choice, perhaps, but choice nonetheless. To wield
the power of constitutional interpretation is to determine the
content of constitutional law.
The arbitrariness of the distinction between (binding) constitutional law and (nonbinding) judge-made law enables courts
to calibrate the boundary between judicial and legislative
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(h) (2004).
87. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 85, at 1275-76. The authors
identify the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but not the Administrative Procedure
Act, as an example of a "super-statute." See id. at 1231, 1237-42.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90. See Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Patriation Reference), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 876; id. at 853 (Laskin, C.J., Estey &
McIntyre, JJ., dissenting).
91. See id. at 774-75; HOGG, supra note 37, § 1.10, at 1-17 to 1-26.
92. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 239-40,
248-50, 265-68 (holding on the basis of "unwritten constitutional principles"
of federalism and democracy that the federal government and other provinces
are obligated to negotiate if a "clear majority" of Quebec's population votes unambiguously to secede).
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power in a highly deliberate manner. Indeed, it would be surprising if, in choosing whether to decide cases on constitutional
or common law grounds, judges did not consider the consequences for legislative power. Judge Kaye of the New York
Court of Appeals has described both the openness of the choice
that judges face, and the potential consequences for other institutions:
Clearly, there are matters that must stand as constitutional, beyond
ready revision. Constitutional issues cannot be avoided, or constitutional principles diluted, or the law manipulated, or responsibility
shirked or deflected to other institutions by resort to the common law
for core policies of that nature. But which are the core policies of that
nature? Where there is no clear discontinuity between common law
and constitutional law, the difficult question is one of definition.
When is a matter properly one of common law and when does it
cross the threshold of constitutional law? A court's stated desire to
preserve flexibility and options by common law solutions is as much a
consequence as a cause for choosing one ground over the other. The
shifts and vacillation among courts, even within courts, between constitutional and nonconstitutional premises suggests that a rationale
93
has yet to emerge.

This passage holds three valuable lessons. First, courts inevitably confront cases in which they must choose between a
common law holding that is subject to legislative revision, and
a constitutional holding that is not. Second, courts have not, in
fact, made this choice in any consistent manner. Third-and
most importantly-in the absence of any "clear discontinuity"
between common law and constitutional law, there is little to
prevent courts from "deflecting" the final decision to elected officials, or reserving it to themselves, as they wish.
The hierarchy of laws that might be supposed to delimit
judicial power is so elastic, in fact, that courts need not even
choose between the categories of constitutional and common
law. They may instead combine the two to produce nonbinding
constitutional law, or what Henry Paul Monaghan calls "constitutional common law."94 As he observes, not only may courts
fail to make clear the extent to which a decision is "constitutional" (binding on the legislature) or "common law" (nonbinding); they may deliberately fail to do so. 95 Why so? Though
Monaghan himself says surprisingly little on the subject, 96 such
93.
94.
HARV.
95.
96.

Kaye, supra note 21, at 751-52.
Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975).
See id. at 2-3, 40-41.
See id. at 30-31 (implying that the making of such distinctions may
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deliberate obscurity seems above all to enable the judiciary to
manage the limits of legislative power with greater precision
than might otherwise be possible-all the while speaking the
language of legislative deference and judicial restraint. In rhetorical terms, the judiciary can claim, plausibly, that it has left
the legislature room to maneuver. In substance, however, the
judiciary has merely invited the legislature to labor within judicially specified limits, while reserving the right to reject the
fruits of those labors. Consider Miranda v. Arizona,97 described
inspired," yet
by Monaghan as fashioning a "constitutionally
"subconstitutional" rule of criminal procedure. 98 The Supreme
Court recently rejected an alternative scheme devised by Congress on the grounds that it was not "at least as effective" as
99
the Miranda rule at preventing coerced confessions. On the
one hand, proclaimed the Court, "Mirandaannounced a consti10 0
tutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively."'
On the other hand, it refused to hold that Miranda warnings
are actually required by the Constitution,'0 1 a fact bitterly emphasized by Justice Scalia in dissent. 10 2 With its elusive nondistinctions between constitutional and common law-and, indeed, between "constitutional" and "constitutional" lawconstitutional common law is in practice a finely tuned instrument of judicial control over legislative power, an act of deference and an act of veto in one, much like Marbury itself.
In sum, the notion that there exist hierarchically ordered
categories of laws and lawmakers does little to guide or constrain judges in deciding the limits of their own power. The
boundaries between the categories are unsettled even in theory,
and this uncertainty enables judges to circumvent and even invert the hierarchy. Judicial enforcement of the hierarchy might
be analogized to a game of rock-paper-scissors between elected
lawmakers and judges, but with a twist: the judiciary also acts
as referee and can declare rock to be paper, paper to be rock, or
even that it has played some combination of rock and paper.
not be a good use of time on the part of a "busy" court).
97. 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (requiring police officers to advise criminal suspects of their constitutional rights prior to interrogation).
98. Monaghan, supra note 94, at 19-20, 34.
99. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (quoting
Miranda,384 U.S. at 467).
100. Id. at 444.
101. See id. at 442 (declining to hold that "nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements").
102. See id. at 446, 450-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The potential for abusive unfairness in this game lies, of
course, in the fact that the judiciary acts as judge in its own
cause, but some form of self-policing is inescapable: any institution assigned the task of allocating public power will possess
both the means and the incentive to favor itself. Ultimately, it
may be unrealistic to think that there exists any foolproof formula by which the watchmen of governmental power can be
expected to watch themselves.
D. THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS OF JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY

In light of these difficulties, it is understandable if courts
happen to employ the hierarchy of laws less as an analytical
device than as a legitimating fiction. What is meant by judicial
legitimacy? It is discussed obsessively, as if it were a precious
commodity to be hoarded,1 0 3 yet for the most part it goes undefined, perhaps for fear that merely to explain judicial legitimacy in plain terms is to undermine it. In practical terms, it
can be described as the ability of courts to secure compliance
with their decisions, absent the powers of the purse or the
sword.10 4 An obvious way in which courts secure such compliance is on the strength of their respective reputations: however
uncertain their basis in positive law, the pronouncements of a
judiciary known for fairness and rectitude stand some chance of
a sympathetic public reception. In India, for example, the judiciary enjoys a unique reputation for integrity in a political environment rife with corruption. 105 This fact alone may both ex103. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing "the public's confidence in the Court" as "a public treasure," "built
slowly over many years"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69
(1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (deeming it "imperative to adhere to the essence" of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for fear of
otherwise inflicting "profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should abstain from "injecting itself into the clash of
political forces" lest it endanger "sustained public confidence in its moral sanction").
104. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The judiciary... has no influence over either the
sword or the purse[,] ...and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."); MARTIN SHAPIRO,
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 13-14 (1981) ("Courts, we
are repeatedly and rightly told, have neither the purse nor the sword .... Most
court systems seem to operate on the assumptions that both parties consent
sufficiently to comply voluntarily at least as long as some vague threat of further judicial action is maintained.").
105. See George H. Gadbois, Jr., The Institutionalization of the Supreme
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plain and sustain the tendency of the Indian bench toward micromanagement of public affairs to an extent that might not be
tolerated elsewhere. 10 6 Sheer tradition may also play a part in
the acceptance of judicial decision making. Once judicial review
has been in place for some time-as in the United States-its
continued acceptance may in part reflect Burkean conservatism
on the part of a citizenry bound to dislike particular decisions
yet unwilling on the whole to jettison a venerable institution.
What constitutional courts generally cannot claim in support of their activities, however, is an electoral mandate. 10 7 The
Court of India, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: CHALLENGING FRONTIERS
IN CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 126 (John R. Schmidhauser ed.,
1987). As even a former President of India has remarked:
It is not an exaggeration to say that the degree of respect and public
confidence enjoyed by the Supreme Court is not matched by many
other institutions in the country.
The judiciary in India has become the last refuge for the people
and the future of the country will depend upon the fulfilment of the
high expectations reposed by the people in it.
K.R. Narayanan, Speech on the Occasion of Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the
Supreme Court of India (Jan. 28, 2000), http://www.india-seminar.com2000
/487/487%20narayanan.htm.
Analogously, it has been suggested that the Israeli judiciary enjoys "considerable political power" because of its reputation for nonpartisanship in a
rampantly partisan society. Martin Edelman, The ChangingRole of the Israeli
Supreme Court, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra, at 93, 97-98; cf.
ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 13

(rev. ed. 2003) (calling the Supreme Court of Israel "the most activist, antidemocratic court in the world").
106. For example, some students who have been turned away from examinations for failure to attend school have been known to obtain ex parte stays
from Indian courts by challenging the propriety of the procedures by which
attendance rules were adopted. See Tripathi, supra note 22, at 60. In response
to environmental concerns, the Supreme Court of India has appointed experts
to inspect mines and quarries and ordered the closing of those found not to be
in compliance with relevant safety standards. See Rural Litig. & Entitlement
Kendera v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 641, 647-50. Other courts
have enforced environmental statutes by banning specific makes, models, and
vintages of taxicabs. See, e.g., Smoke Affected Residents Forum v. Municipal
Corp., Writ Pet. No. 1762/1999 (Apr. 10, 2002), at http://www.elaw.org/
resources/text.asp?ID=1361&lang-es (banning all "Premier 137-D Model"
taxis and "all taxis over the age of 15" except those converted to run on natural
gas).
107. There are, of course, exceptions. Judges of the Japanese Supreme
Court, for example, may be removed by majority vote: article 79 of the Japanese Constitution subjects them to retention votes at the first general election
following their initial appointment, and at ten-year intervals thereafter. See
KENPO, art. 79 (Japan). For discussion of various means by which the ruling
party is said to influence the Japanese judiciary, see Hamano, cited above in
note 22, at 442-59.
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countermajoritarian dilemma is considered a dilemma because
whenever constitutional courts dare to do more than validate
an existing consensus they are subject to a supposedly withering retort: "we did not elect you, so why should we listen to
you?" In less colloquial terms, it is thought that unelected
judges risk disobedience because they cannot directly invoke
the legitimating device of majoritarian consent.1 08
The two qualifications in this statement-"directly" and
"majoritarian"-merit notice. First, even the most independent
of judiciaries is subject to political control, if only because
judges must be continually appointed and replaced. The political character of this control is simply more obvious in some
cases than in others. For example, the members of the German
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, are
elected by the federal legislature on the basis of interparty bargaining and with the input of major interest groups.' 0 9 In more
subtle but equally effective fashion, the members of France's
Conseil Constitutionnel, though appointed for fixed terms, are
chosen from the political milieu and are known for exercising
judgment with political sensitivity-that is, in a manner sensitive to the needs and priorities of the elected government. 110 In
this country, it has been an empirical fact that unelected judges
with life tenure are chosen and replaced in a frequent and systematic way by elected officials.1 11 Between the inescapable fact
of turnover and periodic expansions of the bench, even the relatively independent federal judiciary is decisively reshaped by
elected officials on an ongoing basis. 112
108. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1154 (1993) (arguing that the federal
judges appointed by recent Republican administrations "view the judiciary as
an undemocratic institution within a political order premised on the idea that
governmental legitimacy is derived from the consent of the majority").
109. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 21-22 (2d ed. 1997); David S. Clark, The

Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a
Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1826-29 (1988).
110. See John Bell, Principlesand Methods of JudicialSelection in France,
61 S.CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1763, 1781-86 (1988) (noting that, although the Conseil Constitutionnel has not become a "straightforwardly partisan political
body," a heavy premium is placed in the selection process upon both 'legal and
political skills").
111. See DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 12 (1996).

112. Political scientists have been better attuned to this fact than legal
academics. In an influential and early article, Robert Dahl noted the frequency
and regularity with which Supreme Court Justices have historically been re-
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Second, the legitimating power of majoritarian decision
making should not be overestimated; nor should popular acceptance of judicial review be underestimated. Elections do not reflect universal consent-indeed, perhaps not even plurality
consent. 113 Every popular decision leaves in its wake a minority. Countermajoritarian judicial decision making may beg the
question of its legitimacy in the eyes of the majority, but majoritarian electoral decision making also begs the question of its
legitimacy in the eyes of the minority. 114 Neither form of deciplaced, and deemed it "most unrealistic" that the Court would, "for more than
a few years at most," resist major policy changes sought by a lawmaking majority. Dahl, supra note 34, at 284-85. The same observations apply with
greater force to the lower federal courts. Deborah Barrow, Gary Zuk and
Gerard Gryski observe, for example, that "the combination of new positions
and swelling numbers of vacancies, owing especially to retirements," has enabled modern presidents "to change anywhere from 35 to 60 percent of the
membership on the lower federal courts during their stay in office." BARROW
ET AL., supra note 111, at 12. Thus, "with 9 out of every 10 appointees sharing
the partisan attachment of the chief executive,. . . gargantuan swings in the
political composition of the bench become commonplace." Id.; see also Gary
Zuk et al., Partisan Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, 1869-1992, 21
AM. POL. Q. 439 passim (1993). Without emphasizing the mechanisms of judicial appointment and replacement, Gerald Rosenberg has urged the related
view that the Court cannot resist lawmaking majorities or effect social change
in the face of political resistance on more than a sporadic basis. See
ROSENBERG, supra note 34, passim (arguing that courts cannot usually effect
social reform without the support of the elected branches); Gerald N.
Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV.
POL. 369 passim (1992) (assessing the judicial response to "Court-attacking
bills" over the last two centuries, and concluding that the Court has rarely resisted the preferences of elected lawmakers acting in concert). Collectively,
these findings constitute a direct assault upon the notion that the Framers
created a judicial branch capable of withstanding lawmaking majorities for
any meaningful period of time.
113. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the
winner" of the 2000 presidential election). For the sake of simplicity, it may be
assumed that those who do not vote consent to whatever happens, though the
alacrity with which nonvoters criticize their government suggests otherwise.
114. Indeed, as political scientists and economists have long observed, majoritarian decision-making mechanisms often do not even reflect the wishes of
the majority. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 65136 (1982) (discussing the instability of collective choice mechanisms as demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow and others, and illustrating that the outcome of
voting among three or more alternatives depends upon the order in which alternatives are considered, the method of voting used, the manner in which
preferences are measured, and other factors); David Brady & Mark A. Morgan,
Reforming the Structure of the House AppropriationsProcess: The Effects of the
1885 and 1919-20 Reforms on Money Decisions, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE
AND POLICY 207-33 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (describing how the power of the House Appropriations Committee affects the ex-
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sion making is effective at resolving political disagreement115abIt
sent the acceptance of both the winners and the losers.
may be, in fact, that neither form is widely acceptable without
the other. Judging from the institutional arrangements that
have proven popular and durable, it seems likely that democratic polities accept, if not prefer, some mixture of popular and
countermajoritarian decision making, the critical question being one of relative degree. The fact that minority protections
are written into a constitution may be evidence of such acceptance. The fact that such protections are found in a written
constitution may even create a certain amount of the necessary
acceptance, perhaps by serving as a reminder of principles
adopted upon careful reflection in calmer times. 116 But whether
a written constitution exists, and what it says, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the acceptance of judicial
review in practice.11 7 That acceptance may exist even in the absence of a written constitution that styles itself supreme, as
Paul Craig and Sir Laws and Lord Woolf have in essence ar18
gued. 1
Given the choice, however, constitutional courts tend not to
stake their efficacy solely on the normative appeal of the decisions they render, or on the acceptance of judicial review itself.
The explication of those interests entitled to judicial protection-those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"11 9 or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"1 20 for example-is consistently the task of judges, and it is by nature a
heavily subjective one. Nevertheless, judges go to considerable
tent to which other congressional committees spend on behalf of special interests).
115. Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 104, at 1-8 (discussing the "triadic logic" of
conflict resolution and the precariousness of third-party adjudication absent
the actual consent of the parties to such adjudication).
116. As Stephen Holmes puts it: "A constitution is Peter sober while the
electorate is Peter drunk." Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox
of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195-96 (Jon Elster &
Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
117. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 29, at 139, 319-21 (arguing at length
that constitutions cannot secure their own acceptance but instead presuppose
a degree of existing consensus, and using the spectacular failure of constitutional democracy in Rwanda as an example).
118. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
119. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.), quoted in,
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 n.3 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
120. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.), quoted in, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
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lengths to tether their efforts to their respective constitutions.
If they are fortunate, they may have available to them some
slender snippet of vague but actual text, such as "due process,"
from which entire vistas of possibility unfold; if they have the
nerve, they may even liken what they do to scientific inquiry. 121
Elsewhere, judges may have to make do with "unwritten constitutional principles,"'1 22 or the "basic structure" of the constitution, 123 or the "governmental framework."' 124 From such unpromising materials, the audacious may find a way to strike
down constitutional amendments. 125 Those truly favored by
121. Consider Justice Frankfurter's efforts in Rochin v. California:
Restraints on our jurisdiction are self-imposed only in the sense that
there is from our decisions no immediate appeal short of impeachment or constitutional amendment. But that does not make due process of law a matter of judicial caprice. The faculties of the Due Process
Clause may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case "due process of law" requires an
evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of
science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the
detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc
and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society.
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
122. See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217,
32,
52-54, 88-93, at 239-40, 248-50, 265-68 (holding on the basis of "unwritten
constitutional principles" of federalism and democracy that the federal government and other provinces are obligated to negotiate if a "clear majority" of
Quebec's population votes unambiguously to secede); H.C. 98/69, Bergman v.
Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969) (Isr.), available in translation at
http://62.90.71.124/files-eng/69/980/000/zOl169000980.zOl.pdf (last visited Oct.
14, 2004), at 6 (recognizing "the equality of citizens before the law as a fundamental principle of [Israel's] constitutional regime," and enjoining enforcement
of campaign finance legislation on that basis, notwithstanding the absence of a
written constitution or of any statutory language providing for judicial review).
123. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp. S.C.R. 1,
163-66 (India) (opinion of Sikri, C.J.) (holding unconstitutional a constitutional amendment intended to curtail judicial review of constitutional
amendments); see also infra note 125 (placing the Kesavananda Bharati decision in context).
124. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080, 1086-89 (Cal. 1990) (invalidating part of a ballot proposition on the grounds that it effected "such a
far-reaching change in our governmental framework as to amount to a qualitative constitutional revision, an undertaking beyond the reach of the initiative process").
125. See, e.g., id. at 1086-89; Kesavananda Bharati,(1973) Supp. S.C.R. at
163-66. In its original form, article 368 of the Constitution of India simply described the means by which Parliament may amend the Constitution, subject
in enumerated cases to heightened supermajority requirements. See id. at 3
n.*. The Supreme Court of India initially took the view that constitutional
amendments adopted by Parliament pursuant to article 368 were not them-
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history may even have the opportunity to reject an entire constitution on constitutional grounds. 126 The more extreme the
selves subject to judicial review. See Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, (1952)
3 S.C.R. 89, 105; Tripathi, supra note 22, at 95. In a series of cases beginning
with the Golak Nath decision of 1967, however, the court repeatedly rebuffed
constitutional amendments enacted under article 368 as unconstitutional. In
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, the court took the position that any amendment that "takes away or abridges ... fundamental rights" is unconstitutional
under article 13(2), which provides that "[t]he State shall not make any law
which takes away or abridges... fundamental rights." A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643,
1651-1671 (opinion of Subba Rao, C.J.); INDIA CONST. art. 13(2). Parliament
responded by amending both articles 13 and 368 to preclude judicial review of
constitutional amendments. See KesavanandaBharati,(1973) Supp. S.C.R. at
3-4. In KesavanandaBharati, the Indian Supreme Court softened its position
but nevertheless held the amendments unconstitutional, on the grounds that
Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a manner that impairs its "basic
structure." Id. at 165-66 (opinion of Sikri, C.J.). Once again, Parliament responded by amending article 368, and, once again, in Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India, the court declared the amendments unconstitutional. See
(1981) 1 S.C.R. 206a, 246-59 (opinion of Chandrachud, C.J.).
The extent and desperation of Parliament's efforts to preclude judicial review of constitutional amendments are tragicomic. In relevant part, article
368 currently reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in
exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation
or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the
procedure laid down in this article.
(3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under
this article.
(4) No amendment of this Constitution... shall be called in question
in any court on any ground.
(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be
no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to
amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this
Constitution under this article.
INDIA CONST. art. 368. To understand the political context of the struggle between Parliament and the Supreme Court of India, see Gadbois, cited above in
note 105, at 115-16.
By way of comparison, when faced with an analogous question, the Canadian Supreme Court disavowed any power to review the substance of legislation that overrides the Canadian Constitution. Section 33 of the Canadian
Constitution, the so-called "notwithstanding clause," empowers the legislature
to override certain constitutional rights and specifies the means by which it
may do so. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms), § 33. In Ford v.Quebec, the Court held that section
33 imposes "requirements of form only" and specifically rejected the argument
that the override power may only be exercised following a "fully informed democratic process" in which both the right at stake and its proposed infringement are drawn to the attention of the legislature and the public. [1988]
S.C.R. 712, 740-42.
126. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SALR 744 passim (CC) (holding that the proposed consti-
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case, the clearer it becomes that judges do not obey or interpret
constitutions so much as they make constitutions. 127 Yet whatever license judges can (or cannot) find in the text for their activities, a written constitution that provides, at least arguably,
for judicial review gives them an answer of childlike simplicity
to the critical question of "legitimacy": "we did not elect you, so
why should we listen to you?" By invoking the hierarchical superiority of constitutional law to all other law, a judge says, in
effect, "Don't blame me. The Constitution made me do it." (Or,
as a British judge might say to the executive, "Parliament
made me do it"-an especially transparent fiction given that
the executive leads the Parliament.) 128 To use a constitution in
this way amounts to a form of ventriloquism: an inanimate text
can speak, it turns out, to a bewildering range of questions and
under sociopolitical conditions its authors could not have foreseen, so long as judges supply the words. Perhaps a certain
amount of such obfuscation is necessary if courts are to secure
compliance with controversial decisions, or even to reach popular decisions that also satisfy the internal standards of the legal community. Perhaps such obfuscation is inherently undesirable.1 29 Perhaps it has no effect at all on how people feel
about constitutional courts or judicial review.1 30 Whatever the

tution of 1996 failed to satisfy the requirements of the interim constitution of
1994, and requiring the formulation of a new constitutional text); Albie Sachs,
ConstitutionalDevelopments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695
passim (1996) (discussing the adoption and certification of the South African
Constitution).
127. See, e.g., J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE
CONSTITUTION 191 (14th ed. 1997) (quoting Woodrow Wilson's observation
that the Supreme Court has acted as a "constitutional convention in continuous session"); Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism:18th
to 20th Century, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 311, 330 (noting that in the European
Community, "the protection of individual rights becomes the task of judges
who must develop a common law of basic rights by reference to exceedingly
vague notions of shared values").
128. See, e.g., WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 37, at 28-30; Laws, supra note
52, at 90 & n.51 (quoting Lord Hailsham's notorious description of Parliament
as an "elective dictatorship"); Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 90-92 (same).
129. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 34, at 96 (arguing that the Supreme
Court should not "tell itself or the world that it draws decisions from a text
that is incapable of yielding them").
130. As Judge Posner has argued:
There is no evidence that [public confidence in the courts] depends on
the scrupulousness with which courts confine themselves to fair interpretations of commands laid down in the texts-about which the
public knows little-as distinct from notions of justice or fairness that
are independent of fidelity to texts.
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case may be, judges do not seem prepared to do without it.
Four generic propositions about constitutional adjudication
can now be offered. First, because they cannot compel obedience, constitutional courts and judges are preoccupied with the
problem of their own efficacy. This concern is frequently expressed in terms of "legitimacy," which refers in practice to the
acceptance of judicial review, by the polity or by elites, in whatever combination happens to be necessary. Second, when performing judicial review, judges invoke their respective constitutions in an effort to win this acceptance. Whether this tactic is
13 1
not
effective-or even necessary-is an empirical question,
judges
but
one that can be resolved by constitutional theory,
appear to believe, at least, that it cannot hurt. Third, the act of
judicial review is constrained only loosely by the constitutional
text. Indeed, it can occur in disregard or even direct defiance of
the constitutional text, though judges are anxious to dispel the
appearance thereof. Fourth, what courts actually do when they
perform judicial review is to identify and articulate the interests they deem important enough to deserve protection from interference by the other branches of government: that is, they
practice what has here been labeled the core interests approach. This approach goes by various names in practice but
varies little in substance. It is to the nature and ubiquity of
core interests analysis that we turn next.
II. GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Consider the following passage:
Challenges to governmental action require the reviewing court to
evaluate the importance of the right or interest upon which the government has infringed, the importance of the government's goal, and
the extent to which that goal justifies the government's choice of
means. When important rights or interests are at stake, the government's goal must be of comparable importance, and a close fit must
exist between that goal and the means chosen to achieve it. Similar
requirements apply when the governmental action in question is
aimed at certain vulnerable or disadvantaged groups.

This passage describes the practice of judicial review in which
of the following?
132
(a) The United States
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 136 (1990) (citing,
inter alia, Richard Lehne & John Reynolds, The Impact of Judicial Activism
on Public Opinion, 22 AM. J. POL. Sci. 896 (1978)).
131. See supra note 130.
132. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ob-
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(b) The United Kingdom 133
serving that "all equal protection cases" pose the question whether there exists
"an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential
treatment"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) (observing
that "a weighing process has long been a part of any determination" of the requirements of procedural due process); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[C]ertain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment."); see also, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792-94 (2d
ed. 1988) (observing that First Amendment claims follow one of two "tracks"
depending upon the intent of the governmental restriction, but that "determinations of the reach of first amendment protections on either track presuppose
some form of 'balancing' whether or not they appear to do so"); Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1972) (describing the
Court's movement toward "sliding scale" equal protection review).
133. Though the United Kingdom lacks a written constitution, its courts
perform substantive review of both executive and legislative action under a
combination of domestic and European legal standards reminiscent of the passage above. First, as a matter of domestic law, British courts engage in substantive review of executive action, in reliance upon judicially fashioned principles of administrative law. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text
(describing Wednesbury review). As a matter of practice, if not also formal doctrine, the extent to which they scrutinize such action varies with the importance of the interests at stake. "It is now common to acknowledge that the
courts apply the principles of judicial review, including the Wednesbury test,
with varying degrees of intensity depending upon the nature of the subjectmatter." CRAIG, supra note 60, at 583. In particular, governmental action that
interferes with human rights attracts heightened judicial scrutiny. See id. at
546-48, 582-84 (discussing cases).
Second, British courts now review both executive action and parliamentary legislation for compatibility with both E.U. law and the European Convention on Human Rights. See id. at 559-63, 585-86 (discussing domestic application of the Convention via the Human Rights Act, 1998). To the extent
that claims are raised under E.U. law or the Convention, the courts must engage in proportionality review of the kind employed by the European Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, respectively. See id. at 58998 (discussing the use of proportionality under E.U. law by domestic courts);
see also supra note 37 (discussing the consequences of incompatibility between
parliamentary legislation on the one hand, and E.U. law or the Convention on
the other). Proportionality review can be expressed in different ways but invariably denotes judicial attention to the importance of the competing interests, the extent to which those interests are at stake, and the care taken by
the government in its choice of means. See infra notes 134-37 (discussing Canadian and European implementations of proportionality review); text accompanying notes 165-168 (synthesizing the various strains of proportionality review).
Third, many have suggested that proportionality review is being
adopted-or has already been adopted-by the English courts as a matter of
domestic law, to be applied even in the absence of a claim under E.U. law or
the Convention. See CRAIG, supra note 60, at 585-89, 600; Jeffrey Jowell &
Anthony Lester Q.C., Proportionality:Neither Novel Nor Dangerous, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 51 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 1988);

2005]

GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(c) Canada 134
135
(d) Germany

infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which
Wednesbury review is converging-or has already converged-upon proportionality review of the European variety).
134. The Canadian Constitution explicitly provides that the rights and
freedoms it guarantees are subject to "such reasonable limits ... as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1. To justify the
impairment of a constitutionally guaranteed right or freedom, the government
must establish that its objective is "pressing and substantial," that the means
it has chosen are "rationally connected" to its objective, that the right or freedom in question has been impaired "as little as possible," and that the negative impact upon the right or freedom is "proportional" to the government's
objective. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-40 (citing R. v. Big M. Drug
Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352). In practice, the Court has not actually
required the government's choice of means to impair rights or freedoms "as
little as possible"; rather, it has employed "a more flexible analysis of whether
the degree of impairment of protected rights is justifiable, considering the importance of the right, the degree of intrusion, and the nature of the asserted
government interest." Jackson, supra note 59, at 608 (citing R. v. Keegstra,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697).
135. Germany is credited with the invention of proportionality review, or
Verhdltnismdssigkeit, which has since been adopted by other courts such as
the European Court of Justice. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU
LAW 372 (3d ed. 2003); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 148 (4th ed. 1998). In substance, "the German approach is
not so different from the methodology often employed by the United States
Supreme Court in fundamental rights cases." KOMMERS, supra note 109, at
46. As practiced in Germany, proportionality review is a three-step process.
First, the requirement of Eignung, or suitability, entails that "the means used
must be appropriate ... to the achievement of a legitimate end." Id. Second,
Erforderlichkeit is a measure of necessity and refers to the requirement that
the means adopted by the government "must have the least restrictive effect ... on a constitutional value." Id. By way of comparison with American
constitutional law, Donald Kommers indicates that this standard is in practice
less demanding than the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny, but
would not be satisfied by rational basis review. See id. Third, the principle of
Zumutbarkeit requires that "[t]he burden on the right must not be excessive
relative to the benefits secured by the state's objective." Id.
Justice Helmut Steinberger of the Bundesverfassungsgericht has suggested that, because they share "certain basic institutional and functional
elements"-namely, "federal structures, a system of checks and balances, and
independent courts armed with judicial review of the constitutionality of the
acts of public power"-the American and German constitutional systems are
both characterized by "functionally equivalent standards of evaluations, methodological approaches, and substantive solutions, although their articulation
and the ways and means to arrive at them may differ." Helmut Steinberger,
American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional Development, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ABROAD 194, 216 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds.,
1990) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS].
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(e) France 136
(f) The European Court of Human Rights 137

136. French judicial reasoning is not characterized by the explicit articulation or use of doctrinal tests; rather, by common law standards, French decisions have an unfamiliar tendency to proceed directly from statements of fact
to conclusions of law. Explication of French constitutional doctrine is further
frustrated both by the exceptional brevity of French judgments, and by the extraordinary habits of grammar and organization that they exhibit. See, e.g.,
JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at v (1992) (noting ruefully the
"difficult," "almost incomprehensible structure" of French judgments); Jackson, supra note 59, at 596 n.47; Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put
to the Test: A Comparative Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and
French JudicialDiscourse, 111 HARV. L. REV. 689, 695-96 (1998) (noting that
French judicial decisions take the form of a single sentence). Nevertheless, the
case law of the Conseil Constitutionnel evidences application of the same tests
of constitutionality encountered elsewhere. The first major piece of legislation
to be reviewed by the Conseil, in the 1981 Security and Liberty case, included
a provision authorizing police to conduct identity checks, and to detain a person "for the period necessary to check his identity," up to a maximum of six
hours. See Decision No. 80-127 (Securitg et Liberte), Cons. const., Jan. 19 & 20,
1981, D. 1981, 15, translated in BELL, supra, at 308-15. In upholding the provision, the Conseil stressed entirely familiar considerations-namely, the importance of the government's objectives, the degree to which the provision impaired the right in question, and the tailoring of the law to its objectives. On
the one hand, it characterized the government's goals--"the pursuit of criminals, and the prevention of threats to public order"-as "necessary for the implementation of principles and rights of constitutional value." Id. at 314. On
the other hand, the Conseil found that the degree of "inconvenience" to freedom of movement was "not excessive" in light of the various ways in which the
provision had been narrowly tailored: individuals had the right to establish
their identity "by an appropriate means," detention was authorized only in
cases of "necessity," and detainees enjoyed a variety of safeguards including,
but not limited to, the six-hour time limit. Id. at 313-14.
The Conseil Constitutionnel does not review the constitutionality of executive action; that task belongs exclusively to the French administrative
courts, which are wholly independent of the Conseil Constitutionnel. See Justice Stephen Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization:
Changing Relationships Among European ConstitutionalCourts, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1045, 1058-60 (2000); Bell, supra note 110, at 1760-63, 1781-83; see
also infra note 273 (describing consequences of France's divided judicial system). The Conseil d'Etat is known for applying proportionality review in substance, if not in name. See BROWN & BELL, supra note 60, at 233-35, 263 (noting that proportionality has "assumed increasing importance" in France, and
likening review for erreur manifeste to proportionality review); Jowell & Lester, supra note 133, at 54-56; Boyron, supra note 60, at 239-54.
137. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is responsible for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) and applying it to the member states of the Council of Europe (which is not to be confused with the European Union). See Breyer, supra note 136, at 1057-58. Most
of the rights provisions of the Convention expressly permit such governmental
interference as is "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of... public safety, for the prevention of disorder .... the protection of health or morals,
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(g) The European Union 138
139
(h) Israel
[or] for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others." Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by
Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10(2), http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention
/webConvenENG.pdf [hereinafter European Convention]; see also id. arts. 6(1),
8(2), 9(2), 11(2) (containing similar language). Accordingly, the general approach of the ECHR is to balance the rights at stake against the justifications
offered by the government, subject to a "margin of appreciation" that affords
national governments a measure of deference in their assessment of means
and objectives. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
17-21 (1995) ("weighing up the conflicting interests" of freedom of expression
and the right of others to "proper respect" for their religious beliefs, and upholding the seizure of a film offensive to Catholics from a nonprofit cinema).
As in other jurisdictions, the degree of judicial scrutiny varies with the importance of the interest at stake. See, e.g., id. at 19 (remarking that judicial review must be "strict" when freedom of expression is at stake, in light of its importance); McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-31,
45-46, 56-62 (1995) (holding that the use of potentially lethal force "must be
strictly proportionate" to the government's aims, and ruling, by a vote of ten to
nine, that British authorities used unnecessary force in killing Irish Republican Army terrorists who had prepared a car bomb for use at a parade).
138. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) applies proportionality review
whenever the legality of either Community or member state action is challenged, but the intensity of review varies with the subject matter. When reviewing "policy measures," it will only consider whether the choice of means
was "manifestly inappropriate" to achieve the objectives; when "fundamental
freedoms" are implicated, however, it applies a standard of "necessity" and
demands use of the "least restrictive alternative." See, e.g., TAKIS TRIDIMAS,
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAw 90 (1999); CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra
note 135, at 371-79; Grdinne de Brca, The Principle of Proportionalityand
its Application in EC Law, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 105, 148 (1993) ("[T]he more important the particular right or the particular Community interest affected, and
the greater the adverse or restrictive impact on it, the more closely the Court
of Justice is likely to search for the existence of less restrictive alternatives.").
Proportionality review by the ECJ resembles the German model: it combines
tests of suitability and necessity with an overall assessment of proportionality.
See TRIDIMAS, supra, at 91-92; CRAIG & DE BIRCA, supra note 135, at 372.
The ECJ's use of proportionality review in human rights cases is likely to be
reinforced by article 52 of the new Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, which expressly ties the meaning and scope of rights in the
Charter to that of corresponding rights in the European Convention on Human Rights. See CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, Dec. 7, 2000, art. 52, O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000); supra note 137 (describing
proportionality review under the Convention). The Charter forms part of the
proposed Constitution for Europe, which has yet to be ratified by the member
states. See European Commission, Summary of the Agreement on the Constitutional Treaty, June 28, 2004, at 2, at http://europa.eu.int/futurumdocuments
/other/oth250604 2_en.pdf. However, the Charter already influences the ECJ's
interpretation of E.U. treaties and laws. See CRAIG & DE BIURCA, supra note
135, at 43.
139. The Israeli Supreme Court considers the importance of the governmental objective, the importance of the interest at stake, and the proportional-
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(i) South Africa 140
41
(0) Indial
(k) Japan

142

ity of the governmental objective to the extent of the harm inflicted. For a
vivid example of such balancing and proportionality analysis, see H.C.
5100/94, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (1999), available
in translation at http://62.90.71.124/files_eng/94/OOO/051/aO9/94051000.a09.
pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2005), in which the Court considered the legality of
physical torture as a means of interrogation:
On the one hand, lies the desire to uncover the truth, in accord with
the public interest in exposing crime and preventing it. On the other
hand is the need to protect the dignity and liberty of the individual
being interrogated

....

[T]hese values are not absolute

....

[A] democ-

ratic society ... is prepared to accept that an interrogation may infringe the human dignity and liberty of a suspect-provided that it is
done for a proper purpose and that the harm does not exceed that
which is necessary.
Id. 22, at 21-22. The Court concluded that the interrogation methods in
question were prohibited, see id., but that officials who nevertheless employed
them and thereafter faced prosecution might be able to invoke a defense of necessity, if the means used were "inherent to the very essence of an interrogation" and "both fair and reasonable." Id. 38, at 36.
140. Like section 1 of the Canadian Constitution, section 36 of the South
African Constitution provides that constitutional rights are subject to such
limitations as are "reasonable" and "justifiable in an open and democratic society based upon freedom and equality." S. AFR. CONST. § 36. Analysis under
section 36 of governmental action that impairs a constitutional right "involves
the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on
proportionality." State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 436 (CC)
(Chaskalson, P.) (referring to an identical provision in a predecessor constitution).
141. When a "fundamental right" is impaired, Indian courts will consider
"the nature of the right, the interest of the aggrieved party, and the degree of
harm resulting from the State action." MAHENDRA P. SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA'S
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 33 (10th ed. 2001) (discussing INDIA CONST. art. 13).
Certain fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, are expressly
made subject by the Constitution to "reasonable restrictions." INDIA CONST.
art. 19. In determining whether a restriction is "reasonable," the courts apply
general tests of proportionality and rationality: the restriction "should not be
greater than what is required by the circumstances," and there should exist a
"proximate connection between the restriction and the object sought to be
achieved." SINGH, supra, at A-53.
142. Like many of the constitutions discussed above, the postwar Constitution of Japan contains explicit limitation clauses that require the balancing of
individual rights against the "public welfare." See KENPO arts. 12, 13 (Japan),
translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, app. 3, at 655 (1996). As elsewhere,
the intensity of review varies with the nature of the individual right or interest at stake. Under the Japanese "dual standard" approach, restrictions on
property rights and economic legislation receive less scrutiny. Mindful of
America's experience with the Lochner era, the drafters of the Japanese Constitution rendered protection of economic and property rights subject to "public
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There is, of course, no single correct answer. What the passage describes is nothing less than generic constitutional
analysis. To be sure, every jurisdiction has its own magic
words: constitutions employ different language, and courts
have different ways in which they prefer to formulate their
tests of constitutionality. A constitution may speak of "equal
protection," 143 or "equality" and "equal protection," 144 or "equal
protection and equal benefit." 145 Rights may be subject to "reasonable restrictions,"' 146 or such limitations that are "necessary
in a democratic society" 147 or required by the "public welfare."'1 48 Around the world, constitutional courts apply different
levels of scrutiny keyed to the importance of the interests at

welfare" exceptions in a way that "life" and 'liberty" protections are not. See
Nobushige Ukai, The Significance of the Reception of American Constitutional
Institutions and Ideas in Japan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA, supra note
22, at 120-22 (comparing articles 29 and 31 of the Japanese Constitution). In
the equal protection context, the Supreme Court of Japan "has never resorted
to strict judicial scrutiny and has been reluctant to develop standards from
which heightened judicial scrutiny might be derived." Hidenori Tomatsu,
Equal Protection of the Law, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202 (Percy R.
Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). It is consistently observed that
judicial review in Japan is extremely deferential in practice. See, e.g., BEER &
ITOH, supra, at 24 (noting only six cases, over forty-five years, in which the
Japanese Supreme Court has invalidated legislation); DAVID M. BEATTY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 121 (1995) ("Among comparativists, constitutional review in Japan is regarded as the most conservative
and cautious in the world."); Hamano, supra note 22, at 443; Kazuyuki Takahashi, Why Do We Study ConstitutionalLaws of Foreign Countries, and How?,
in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8,
at 35, 47 ('We are concerned.., about a court so subdued as to deprive judicial review of all its significance."); Noriho Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States and Japan, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at 182 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court of Japan has almost no idea that government action should be bound strictly by the Constitution."). Even if the court fails to strike down a law, however, it will perform
proportionality review of the manner in which the government applies the law.
See Hamano, supra note 22, at 445-46 (discussing Toyama v. Japan, 20
KEISHU 8, 901 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1966), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER &
HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970: SELECTED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, at 85 (1978)).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
144. INDIA CONST. art. 14.
145. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 15.
146. INDIA CONST. art. 19(2)-(6) (qualifying rights of expression, assembly,
movement, and profession).
147. European Convention, supra note 137, arts. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2); see
supra note 137.
148. KENPO arts. 12, 13, 22, 29 (Japan).
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stake, but not all use the word "proportionality" to describe this
form of analysis. 149 Some constitutional texts are more comprehensive than others, but a shorter constitutional text does not
imply fewer or simpler constitutional concepts. A laconic constito furnish a greater proportution may simply require judges
150
vocabulary.
requisite
the
of
tion
Such variations in text and terminology do not appear to
engender deep dissimilarities in the analytical structure of
rights adjudication. Just as there are only so many institu151
tional configurations available to a constitutional democracy,
there may only be so many ways to perform judicial review of
legislation. General patterns of judicial review are not difficult
to discern. What Donald Kommers says of the Bundesverfassungsgericht might equally be said of other courts: "In much of
its work, the court seems less concerned with interpreting the
Constitution-that is, defining the meaning of the documentary
text-than in applying an ends-means test for determining
149. See David Beatty, ProtectingConstitutionalRights in Japan and Canada, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 535, 544 (1993) ("[Tjhe American multi-tiered framework of judicial review is simply the balancing and proportionality principles
by other names.... In substance, the criteria of constitutionality are exactly
the same.").
150. The U.S. Constitution, for instance, is under 8000 words long, including all amendments. See U.S. CONST. By comparison, the Indian Constitution
weighs in at over 22,000 words, excluding schedules and appendices; as originally published with all accoutrements, it ran to 254 pages. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism
Abroad, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 448-49. Brevity is arguably a virtue in constitution writing. See LUDWIKOWSKI & FOX, supra note 74, at 195, 201 (contrasting the U.S., Indian, and Soviet constitutions
and arguing that shorter constitutions tend to be more "effective"). It is a consequence of brevity, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court "has taken what is
unquestionably the world's shortest and most laconic constitutional statement
of human rights and engrafted on it a set of rules, and a framework of analysis, that is as complex and doctrinaire as the jurisprudence written by any
court in the world." DAVID M. BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 112 (1995). For example, while other constitutions frequently contain express language limiting the rights found therein, see L'Heureux-Dub6,
supranote 23, at 31-32 (discussing the ubiquity in modern constitutional texts
of "justification provisions" that expressly allow such limitations upon rights
as can be justified); supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (describing
various limitations clauses), the Court has been required to articulate and impose such limits itself, "as a matter of 'judicial legislation' and without any express direction in the Bill of Rights." HOGG, supra note 37, § 35.1, at 35-3; Peter W. Hogg, Canada'sNew Charter of Rights, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 297
(1984).

151.

See Robert A. Dahl, Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Con-

clusions from Democratic Experience, in POLITICAL ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII

175, 183-86 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., 1996).
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whether a particular right has been overburdened in the light
of a given set of facts."152 Canadian scholar David Beatty makes
the point forcefully:
What is striking about this jurisprudence of constitutional rights
when it is examined comparatively is how, even though the courts
generally do not frequently refer to each other's judgments, the reasoning they follow and the doctrines they develop to define their powers are virtually identical.153
[T]he rules of constitutional law can be reduced to two basic principles or tests. To establish the constitutional pedigree of a law it must
be shown, first, that the public interest or purpose of the law is of sufficient importance that it offsets (justifies) whatever limitation or restriction it imposes on individuals or groups or other orders of government. Some might call this a utilitarian standard of
constitutionality, or a test of 'proportionality,' or balance.... [T]he
courts also insist that the means, or particular method, that it employs meet a basic standard of 'rationality'-or necessity-as well....
Together, these two basic principles require those who have been
entrusted with the powers of the state to act with a measure of mod5
eration and proportion.1 4

The difficulty with Beatty's argument lies in the manner in
which it elides the descriptive and the normative. There is a
reason why Beatty identifies the generic "tests" of constitutionality as "basic principles": his argument is not merely that constitutional courts employ generic analytical methods, but
rather that these methods are intrinsically desirable. 155 In his
view, the ubiquity of particular tests reflects an "overarching,
unified method of constitutional review that does distinguish,
in an objective and principled way, between laws that are constitutional and those that are not." 156 That is, he identifies the
actual with the good in a manner that implies the actual exists
because it is good. Sujit Choudhry astutely characterizes
Beatty's argument as an example of "universalist interpretation," defined by the normative premise that the mere existence
of a legal principle in many legal systems is evidence of its
"truth or correctness."' 57 A strictly descriptive formulation of
generic constitutional analysis might therefore do best to avoid

152. KOMMERS, supra note 109, at 46 (likening the German and American
approaches to constitutional adjudication).
153. Beatty, supra note 32, at 133.
154. BEATTY, supra note 142, at 15-16.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 15.
157. Choudhry, supra note 28, at 890; see id. at 834-35 (discussing Beatty's
views).
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such terms as "proportionality" and "rationality" that double as
normative principles. What is sought is an account of what constitutional courts do, not an argument that what they do is in
some sense good.
Such an account might go like this. The rights and protections that constitutions confer are inevitably subject to such restrictions as courts consider justifiable. In deciding whether a
particular restriction is tolerable, courts employ the two means
of problem solving that are perhaps most familiar to lawyers,
balancing 158 and means-end analysis. 159 Balancing requires the
court to evaluate both the relative importance of the conflicting
interests at stake and the extent to which these interests are at
stake. In the context of rights adjudication, the interests to be
balanced will typically be the government's objectives, on the
one hand, and individual rights or protections, on the other: the
more important the latter, the more important the former must
be to justify their infringement. This balancing is qualified by
the extent to which each interest is implicated: a search of one's
person and possessions strikes more deeply at privacy and
property interests when conducted at home, for example, than
when conducted at the airport, while the government's interest
in public safety follows the opposite pattern. As the interests to
be weighed are incommensurable, however, judicial balancing
is not merely imprecise; it is incapable of precision. The notion
of balancing presupposes weighing and measurement, yet the
only metric available to judges is that of analogy. The other
technique in the judicial repertoire, means-end analysis, is concerned not with the nature of the governmental objective, but
with how that objective is achieved. Courts will attempt to determine whether the objective could have been satisfactorily
achieved in a manner less injurious to the individual interest at
stake: the more important the interest, the less that unnecessary impairment of it will be tolerated.
This two-part account of generic constitutional analysis
mirrors Justice Breyer's own description of what constitutional
courts do when faced with important conflicting interests.

158. "[L]awyers who are typically trained to resolve conflicts will be inclined to think that balancing competing interests is the most rational way of
resolving problems." Tushnet, supra note 24, at 336.
159. "[Mleans-end rationality is closer to the center of the legal enterprise
[o]r than reasoning by analogy." POSNER, supra note 130, at
than logic ....
107-08.
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Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC16o required the

Court to revisit the tangled thicket of campaign finance regulation, in which rights of speech and association coexist uneasily
with restrictions intended to combat corruption and secure public confidence in democratic processes. In a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer identified balancing
and means-end analysis as the Court's two tasks in complex
cases:
[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways[,] the Court has closely scrutinized
the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained from employing
a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it
has balanced interests. And in practice that has meant asking
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of
proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others (perhaps,
but not necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior, less
restrictive alternative).161

The generic character of this approach was not lost on Justice
Breyer, who proceeded to describe it as "consistent with that of
other constitutional courts facing similarly complex constitutional problems," and to offer decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court by way of
example. 162 Elsewhere, Justice Breyer has spoken of the dawning "global legal enterprise,"'16 3 an ominous phrase to those who
fear the judicial imposition of foreign law. 164 The enterprise
that he describes, however, may be a naturally occurring one,
insofar as it is defined not by common results, but by the problem-solving skills shared by lawyers everywhere.
Whether balancing and means-end analysis can or should
be described as proportionality review is a question of terminology. 165 The term "proportionality" is fraught with difficulty.
In part because it is so widely used by different courts, the term

160. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
161. Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 403 (citing Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
(1998), and Libman v. Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (Can.)).
163. Breyer, supra note 4.
164. See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 7 (opening statement of
Rep. Tom Feeney) (quoting Justice Breyer's language with disapproval).
165. See Jackson, supra note 59, at 609 ("While the language of 'proportionality' is not generally used in the United States, the underlying questions-involving the degree of fit between the claimed objective and the means
chosen, and a concern for whether the intrusion on rights or interests is excessive in relation to the purpose-are already an important part of some fields of
U.S. constitutional law ...").
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has defied consistent definition. Allowing for differences in the
ways that courts formulate their approaches, however, proportionality consistently emerges as an umbrella term that implies
both identification and weighting of the relevant conflicting interests, and evaluation of the extent to which the conflict may
be minimized by careful choice of means. For purposes of conceptual clarity, it may be better to speak separately of balancing and means-end analysis. There is no set sequence in which
courts will perform these steps, under the name of proportionality or otherwise; nor are they always kept distinct. 166 Some
167
courts may impose threshold tests of weighing or balancing;
others may be prepared to assume implicitly that a governmental objective is sufficiently weighty to justify some restriction in
principle but hold that the means adopted is unnecessarily injurious to the individual interest at stake. 168 Whether or not
one agrees with Beatty that these techniques amount to an "objective and principled" way of deciding constitutional questions,
their sheer ubiquity suggests that courts resort to them for lack
of better alternatives. The heuristics available to the legal mind
in the face of normative conflict are few. Though there exist
verbal formulae that purport to define the tasks of balancing
and means-end analysis, these definitions-and the variations
among them-may not make much practical difference. Judges
are inevitably required to exercise that subjective and therefore
distrusted quality known as judgment. It is the irony of constitutional adjudication that judges are so often reluctant to advertise their reliance upon the very quality for which they are
most required.

166. See, e.g., CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 135, at 372 (noting that the
ECJ will sometimes collapse the second and third stages of the proportionality
inquiry); TRIDIMAS, supra note 138, at 92 (same).
167. In Canada, for example, the government must first proffer a "pressing
and substantial" objective capable of justifying an infringement upon a fundamental right or freedom before the court will perform any balancing or
means-end analysis. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-39. In practice,
however, few cases are decided on the basis of this threshold requirement. See
HOGG, supra note 37, §§ 35.8, 35.9(b), at 35-15 to 35-21.
168. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 132, at 26-30 (discussing cases in which
the U.S. Supreme Court has engaged in means scrutiny to avoid reaching the
merits of difficult constitutional claims).
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III. GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

A. THE VARYING USES OF FOREIGN DOCTRINE
It is very common for constitutional courts to consider
what courts elsewhere have done. Some, such as the Israeli Supreme Court, borrow systematically from other countries; 169 the
U.S. Supreme Court, by comparison, considers the constitutional law of other jurisdictions only sporadically. 170 Indeed, the
mere mention of foreign case law in a Supreme Court decision
attracts attention in this country precisely because it is so
rare.171 To discuss what other courts have done, however, is not
necessarily to imitate them. The uses to which judges put foreign legal materials are varied. No one supposes that foreign
case law ever constitutes controlling authority. However, the
mere fact that a court somewhere has reached a particular conclusion may imbue that conclusion with some vestige of authority or precedential value.1 72 Alternatively, a foreign decision
can be treated as nothing more than a potential source of persuasive reasoning, akin to an academic treatise, or it can be
used for reasons having nothing at all to do with either its precedential or persuasive value. Foreign materials can be used in
merely evidentiary fashion: Justice Kennedy's oft-criticized references in Lawrence v. Texas to European case law and British
legislative materials 173 were made not to harmonize American
constitutional law with foreign law, but rather to refute histori175
174
cal assertions upon which Bowers v. Hardwick had relied.
169. See Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have
Been the Second Germanizationof American Equal ProtectionReview, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 284, 284 n.1 (1998) (describing the Israeli Supreme Court as "the
most important comparative constitutional law institute of the world").
170. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 23, at 37-38.
171. See id. at 38; Greenhouse, supra note 4.
172. See Posner, supra note 27, at 41 (stressing the "essential distinctions.., between citing a decision as controlling authority and as authority
that is not controlling, and between citing a decision as either kind of authority and as no authority at all").
173. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (citing an advisory committee report to the British Parliament and the ECHR's decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom). For criticism of the Lawrence majority's use of
foreign materials, see, for example, Steyn, cited above in note 5, at 56, Wooten,
cited above in note 5, and the congressional resolutions and testimony discussed above in note 16.
174. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
175. See Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalMaterialsand Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 72-82 (2004) (not-
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In fact, Justice Kennedy has publicly defended the Court's reluctance to cite European case law.176 References to foreign legal materials may simply be a form of courtesy: as Justice
O'Connor has put it, to take notice of other courts may help to
"create that all important good impression" among them. 177
Such courtesy is not necessarily idle: the appearance, if nothing
more, of engaging in international judicial dialogue may increase a court's own influence and prestige. 178 Not least of all,
comparison often teaches courts not what to emulate, but what
to avoid. Other courts have explicitly considered the U.S. approaches to hate speech, pornography, and capital punishment,
only to reject them; 179 nor are they anxious to recreate
ing that international materials were "used defensively" in Lawrence to "defeat unsupported claims" about the universality of opposition to sodomy);
Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 17 (prepared statement of Vicki C.
Jackson) (noting that the use of foreign materials in Lawrence was partly to
"to correct or clarify the historical record referred to in Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick").
176. See BORK, supra note 105, at 24-25 (describing how Justice Kennedy
"bore the brunt of the attack on the Court's alleged 'insularity"' at the American Bar Association's 2000 meeting in London but "did not succumb to this...
insolent foreign browbeating').
177. Rankin, supra note 5 (quoting a speech given by Justice O'Connor in
2003).
178. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 23, at 37-40 (observing, from the
vantage point of the Canadian Supreme Court, that the Rehnquist Court's
failure to "take part in international dialogue" has impaired its influence);
Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 23, at 198 (suggesting that Canadian and South African courts have been rewarded with disproportionate influence for their ability "to capture and crystallize the work of their fellow constitutional judges around the world"); Wu, supra note 10 (describing the
Supreme Court's references to foreign materials as "a useful courtesy" by
which the Court "increases its intellectual influence," even if it "proceed[s] to
ignore their reasoning'); cf. Schauer, supra note 25, at 258-59 (suggesting that
nations seek to maximize their "international legal influence" and shape their
constitutional law "to maximize the likelihood" of such influence).
179. See Donald P. Kommers, Comparative ConstitutionalLaw: Its Increasing Relevance, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 8, at 63 ("In recent decades .... the U.S. Constitution has
served mainly as a negative model of constitutional governance around the
world, not only with respect to governmental structures and relationships, but
also.., with respect to certain guaranteed rights."); L'Heureux-Dub6, supra
note 23, at 26-27, 36-37 ("Cross-pollination helps not only when we accept the
solutions and reasoning of others, but when we depart from them, since even
then, understanding and articulating the reasons a different solution is appropriate for a particular country helps make a better decision."); Rapaczynski, supra note 150, at 405, 407-08 (noting that the U.S. Constitution has exerted upon other constitutions both "positive influence" of the kind that
inspires imitation and "negative influence" of the kind that prompts pursuit of
a different approach); Schauer, supra note 25, at 258.
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Lochner-style180 restrictions upon government regulation in
18 1
their own countries.
Precisely because courts consult foreign doctrine to varying
degrees and make inconsistent uses of what they observe, the
mere fact that they acknowledge one another does not by itself
predict the emergence of generic constitutional doctrine. It is
not self-evident that comparative constitutional analysis, without more, will lead courts to converge rather than to diverge.
Much has been made, by supporters and critics alike, of the extent to which communication and doctrinal borrowing have increased among judges and courts. 8 2 But the full panoply of
homogenizing pressures at work may escape the recognition
and control of the judges themselves. Most notably, the manner
in which constitutional courts share common theoretical concerns and analytical methods, as discussed above, is likely to
yield doctrinal similarities regardless of whether judges consciously interact with one another. Other reasons to expect generic constitutional doctrine include the extent to which constitutional language and history are shared by different
jurisdictions, the recurring practical challenges of governance
that courts must confront, the influence of legal scholarship,
the homogenizing tendencies of federal and supranational
structures, and the desire of courts with overlapping jurisdictions to avoid conflict. These factors, and others, will be considered below.
B. JUDICIAL COMMUNICATION + AD Hoc BORROWING
GLOBAL LAW?
It has been suggested that we are witnessing, as Justice
18 3
Breyer puts it, the dawning of a "global legal enterprise."
Similarly, if less stirringly, Justice Ginsburg and Canadian
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 speak of an "international dialogue" on human rights questions.18 4 It is unclear, however,
180.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

181. See Anthony Ogus, PropertyRights and Freedom of Economic Activity,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 125, 142-43 (noting
"the reluctance of constitutions and judges to pursue freedom of contract ideals" in light of Lochner); Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative
Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1 (2004) (arguing that Lochner discourse serves in other countries as a negative guide to constitutional adjudication).
182. See infra Part III.B.
183. Breyer, supra note 4.
184. See Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 6, passim; L'Heureux-Dub6, supra
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what the nature or consequences of this global judicial "enterprise" or "dialogue" happen to be. Anne-Marie Slaughter writes,
for example, of a "global community of courts," of judges experiencing "a change in their own consciousness" as they "increasingly com[e] to recognize each other as participants in a common judicial enterprise." 18 5 But the reality that she describes
is, by comparison, less exalted:
[Constitutional judges] are coming together in all sorts of ways. Literally, they meet much more frequently in a variety of settings, from
seminars to training sessions and judicial organizations. Figuratively,
they read and cite each other's opinions, which are now available in
these various meetings, on the Internet, through clerks, and through
the medium of international tribunals that draw on domestic case law
and then cross-fertilize to other national courts. 8 6

In other words, judges communicate, both directly and indirectly, more extensively than before. On this account, the
"global community of courts" sounds more like a literary salon
writ large than a global judicial body that will fashion and impose an internationally harmonized body of constitutional law.
Critics, nevertheless, have predicted the direst of consequences. Robert Bork warns that judges everywhere are in
thrall of what he calls the "New Class," comprised of socialist
and antireligious "faux intellectuals" who "hopen to outflank
American legislatures and courts by having liberal views
adopted abroad and then imposed on the United States." 18 7
John McGinnis, meanwhile, has testified before Congress that
"citing... foreign cases.., might seem very chic to the cognoscenti, but that cosmopolitan style comes with a price": it "has
the potential to alienate our citizens from their own Constitution"-which, in turn, undermines the stability of the Republic. 188 Not to be outdone, Jeremy Rabkin has alleged that the

European Union "is really set on... undermining American
sovereignty" and seeks to do so by "infiltrat[ing] into our judicial system this idea that our judges need to listen to what
9
their judges say."18

note 23, passim; The Hon. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, From Many Different
Stones: A House of Justice, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 659, 667-68 (2003).
185. Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 23, at 193-94.
186. Id. at 192.
187. BORK, supranote 105, at 2-16.
188. See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 29 (statement of John
Oldham McGinnis) ("Our citizens' affection for their own constitution is one of
the things that keeps our republic stable.").
189. Id. at 49.
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In this country, at least, such drastic consequences seem
unlikely to result from increased judicial communication alone.
More plausibly, those justices who travel frequently to international conferences will become more likely to indulge research
on the part of their clerks into the case law of courts whose
members they have met, and which they now hold in intellectual esteem. The relevant thought process, if read aloud, might
go something like this:
I have now met a number of the English (or Canadian or German)
judges and found them clever and capable. I think I shall make a
point of reading their opinions in the future. I may want to borrow
ideas from them and perhaps even cite them as persuasive authority,
if and when it seems relevant and appropriate to do so--which admittedly may never be the case, even putting aside the criticism I will attract for considering such materials at all.

Professional admiration and courtesy aside, the use of foreign materials may also be encouraged by the "law of the instrument. 190 Having a hammer leads one to ask not how problems can best be solved, but whether they can be solved with a
hammer. Similarly, merely knowing how another court has
dealt with a problem can make that approach attractive. If it
turns out, for instance, that the Canadian Supreme Court has
"appl[ied] somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar
circumstances," 191 a ready-made and therefore attractive solution arguably exists. The extent of such ad hoc borrowing, however, will depend upon what judges know about the work of
other courts. By the judges' own admission, that knowledge is
likely to be limited in this country, no matter how it may be
valued in principle. 192 Unlike its Israeli counterpart,' 93 the U.S.

190. See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY
FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 28 (1964) ("[The law of the instrument.... may be

formulated as follows: Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding."); cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law
ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996) (noting that
the common law style of constitutional adjudication prevalent in this country
values ready-made solutions for the sheer reason that they are ready-made).
191. Breyer, supra note 4.
192. See Posner, supra note 27, at 41 ("[T]he judicial systems of the rest of
the world are immensely varied and most of their decisions inaccessible, as a
practical matter, to our monolingual judges and law clerks."); Breyer, supra
note 4. ("Neither I nor my law clerks can easily find relevant comparative material on our own.").
193. See Somek, supra note 169, at 284 n.1 (observing that the Israeli Supreme Court's strength in comparative constitutional analysis stems in part
from its "practice of employing clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on their country of origin").
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Supreme Court does not hire clerks from other countries to assist with the task of comparative analysis. The sheer difficulty
of the task may be incentive enough for the Justices to stick
with domestic materials.
C. GENERIC TEXT, GENERIC DOCTRINE
Apart from ad hoc communication and peer pressure
among judges, there do exist more systematic and profound
reasons to expect the emergence of generic constitutional doctrine. Perhaps the most obvious reason is the extent to which
constitutions themselves borrow from one another. The cumulative result of such borrowing amounts, arguably, to a lingua
franca of constitutional provisions. The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, for example, borrows from international
human rights documents; the constitutions of South Africa and
Israel, in turn, borrow both from those same international
documents and from the Canadian Charter.194 The South African Constitution even obligates courts to consider "international law" and encourages them to consider "foreign law" when
interpreting rights provisions. 19 5 Having been imposed by the
United States after World War II, the Japanese Kenp6 is influenced by American constitutional law, to say the least. 196 India's Constitution was not adopted under compulsion but bears
both British and American imprints; indeed, in many cases, its
text was modified to better reflect the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. 197 Even the U.S. Constitution
194. See John Claydon, InternationalHuman Rights Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4 SUP. CT. L. REV.
287, 295-302 (1982) (noting the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights, the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international human rights instruments upon the Canadian Charter);
L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 23, at 24; Lorraine Weinrib, The CanadianCharter as a Model for Israel's Basic Laws, 4 CONST. F. 85, 85-87 (1993) (suggesting that the Canadian Charter offered Israel an attractive example because it
is a "coherent national statement" of values and priorities found more generally in the "post-World War Two family of rights-protecting instruments").
195. S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1).
196. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Beer, Constitutionalism and Rights in Japan
and Korea, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 230-43;
Hamano, supra note 22, at 415 n.1, 426-42; Rapaczynski, supra note 150, at
429-33 (observing that the "Preamble alone contains echoes of the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, and other
U.S. documents, and no echoes of any Japanese sources"); Takahashi, supra
note 142, at 46-47.
197. See Tripathi, supra note 22, at 62-79. Notably, even the Indian Constitution's failures to emulate the U.S. Constitution reflected profound Ameri-
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did not spring forth from a vacuum; America did not invent
such concepts as habeas corpus 198 or trial by jury. 199 It would be
surprising if courts entirely failed to interpret similar or even
identical constitutional language in similar ways. Historical
linkages-such as those between the United Kingdom and
other common law jurisdictions-may heighten the similarities,
especially to the extent that courts are disposed toward
originalism, though this tendency may be unusually or even
200
uniquely American.
D. GENERIC CONCERNS, GENERIC DOCTRINE
Courts may also develop generic constitutional doctrine in
response to common theoretical and practical concerns. The
countermajoritarian dilemma is one such concern: as discussed
in Part I, courts feel compelled to define and justify their power
in such a way as to secure widespread acceptance. One way in
which they may attempt to do so is by refusing to decide what
they consider "political questions." As Beatty observes, American and Japanese courts have fashioned "political question"
doctrines that immunize from judicial review "almost all issues
of foreign affairs, national security and the operational structures of government."20 1 They have done so, moreover, despite
the fact that the constitution of neither country calls for judicial
202
abstention on such questions.
can influence. Its drafters had initially planned to include a due process clause
along the lines of the Fifth Amendment but abandoned the idea after consultations with Justice Frankfurter and instead adopted phrasing drawn from the
Japanese Constitution-which had itself been written by Americans. See Rapaczynski, supra note 150, at 448-51. In a further twist of irony, the adoption
of the Japanese version did not prevent the Indian Supreme Court from introducing American-style due process jurisprudence. See id. at 450-51. American
justices and law professors were also influential in persuading the drafters not
to adopt American-style federalism. See id. at 449 n.219.
198. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, with, e.g., Habeas Corpus Act,
1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
199. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII, with, e.g., Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W.
& M., c. 2, § I, cl. 11 (Eng.) ("[J]urors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason ought to be
freeholders.").
200. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 23, at 33-34 (contrasting American
with Canadian and Australian perspectives on the relevance of original intent
to constitutional adjudication).
201. Beatty, supra note 32, at 133-34.
202. See id.; Beatty, supra note 149, at 537-38; Hamano, supra note 22, at
447-52 (discussing the Japanese Supreme Court's refusal to decide cases under article 9 of the Kenp6).
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Constitutional courts must also shape constitutional doctrine to reflect the extent of market regulation and income redistribution in modern economies. Unless courts wish to attempt the dismantling of the administrative state or welfare
state-in the face of what is likely to be insurmountable opposition-they must accommodate property rights to a wide range
of governmental restrictions beyond those necessary for the
prevention of force or fraud. Some constitutions facilitate this
task by qualifying economic interests in ways that they do not
qualify other interests. The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, for example, does not even contain the words "property" or "contract,"203 while the Japanese Kenp5 explicitly subjects property rights, but not other types of rights, to regulation
consistent with the "public welfare." 204 By contrast, there exists
no comparable textual basis in the U.S. Constitution for the
disfavoring of property rights relative to other liberty interests. 205 Nevertheless, it is by now well established that freedom
of contract, though constitutionally protected, will ordinarily be
required to yield to legislation that furthers the general welfare. 206 Regardless of constitutional text, the consistent pattern
among courts is to employ varying levels of scrutiny, and to reserve the least stringent scrutiny for economic regulation.
Another practical concern that courts confront is the fact
that governments must allocate finite resources in pursuit of
competing goals. Scarcity of resources dictates the underenforcement of social and economic rights, relative to traditional
civil and political liberties 20 7 that can be upheld at little or no
economic cost to the state. Thus, though many constitutions
contain provisions that purport to direct or obligate the state to
pursue particular social welfare goals, these provisions tend by

203. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I.
204. See KENPO art. 29 (Japan) ("Property rights shall be defined by law, in
conformity with the public welfare."); id. art. 31 (providing that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law," but omitting any
mention of "property"); supra note 142 (discussing the "dual standard" approach of Japanese courts).
205. See generally U.S. CONST.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938); W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 515, 537 (1934).
207. On the distinction between "civil-political" and "economic-social"
rights, see Louis Henkin, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS,
cited above in note 135, at 8-9, 14-15.
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their own terms to be judicially unenforceable. 208 In this country, the outcome has been the same: the Constitution expresses
no social or economic policy objectives in the first place, and the
Court has explicitly rejected the idea that the Due Process
Clause affirmatively guarantees "minimal levels of safety and
security."20 9 By contrast, the Japanese Kenp5 explicitly provides that "[a]ll people shall have the right to maintain the
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living," without
in any way limiting judicial enforcement of this right.210 Not
surprisingly, the Japanese Supreme Court quickly cast doubt
211
upon the enforceability of this provision.
E. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A historically significant reason why jurisdictions have
shared legal doctrine with one another, in the absence of any
formal compulsion or overarching authority, has been the influence of doctrinal legal scholarship. For centuries, the blend
of Roman and canon law known as the ius commune-literally,
the "common law"-observed no national boundaries and found
explication not in judicial opinions, but in a body of legal commentary and in the curricula of European universities. 212 In the
208.

See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 37 (providing that the "Directive Principles

of State Policy" found in Part IV of the Indian Constitution, unlike the

"Fundmental Rights" set forth in Article III, "shall not be enforceable by any
court"); IR. CONST. art. 45 (setting forth "principles of social policy ... intended
for the general guidance of the" legislature that "shall not be cognisable by any
Court"); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-27 (1992) (noting that post-World War II European constitutions have often supplemented "traditional negative liberties" with "affirmative social and economic rights or obligations," yet "no democratic country has placed social and economic rights on precisely the same legal footing as
the familiar civil and political liberties").
209. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989).
210. KENPO art. 25 (Japan).
211. See Beer, supra note 196, at 237 & 256 n.48 (remarking that article 25
is "in some cases justiciable" but remains the subject of "serious debate" in Japan); Glendon, supra note 208, at 528-30 (discussing article 25 and the Japanese Supreme Court's decision in Asahi v. Japan).
212. See H. Patrick Glenn, PersuasiveAuthority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 26668 (1987) (describing the historical European view of Roman law as "universal
learning" that defied national boundaries, and which relied for its content not
upon judicial opinions, but rather upon a legal literature consisting of "questions, with attempts at reasoned responses"); R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the
PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European lus Commune,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964 n.12 (1990) (describing the ius commune as "the
law studied in European universities and regularly applied in continental

708

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:652

Anglo-American tradition as well, some prominent works have
come to enjoy authority in their own right. 213 For a variety of
reasons, doctrinal scholarship seems unlikely to recapture
those halcyon days of influence. 214 Nonetheless, insofar as treatises, restatements, model codes, and the like have fostered interstate uniformity in areas of private law, it is reasonable to
suspect that legal scholarship may also have encouraged uniformity in the development of public law.
The American experience, at least, suggests that doctrinal
writing is indeed a force for homogenization in the constitutional arena. To the extent that state courts consult the academic literature, they are likely to find either that their own
state constitutions are not discussed at all, or that their constitutional law is fungible with that of other states-if not also
with federal constitutional law. 2 15 In the nineteenth century,

courts in the absence of local statute or custom to the contrary"); M.H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception of Foreign Law in the Antebellum United
States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 754 (2002) (defining the ius commune as a mixture of Roman and canon law that dominated western Europe from the late
eleventh through the fifteenth centuries).
213. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principlesand the Forms of Legal Literature,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 63436, 667 (1981) (noting the recognition in English legal argument of certain
"works of authority," and offering as an example Littleton's Tenures, circa
1481, which came to be "treated as though it were itself law" and "regarded
with a reverence approaching that accorded an actual statute").
214. See, e.g., Glenn, supra note 212, at 287 ("[L]egal writers in the United
States have.. . become largely preoccupied with giving 'an account of what is
happening amongst themselves' and accusations of narcissism, personal bias
and self-interest are now common coin in United States legal discourse." (quoting Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149,
1151 (1981))); Simpson, supra note 213, at 677-79 (speculating that Legal Realism has negatively affected the American treatise-writing tradition by undermining the notion that judicial opinions express "some rational scheme of
principles"); Christopher D. Stone, From a LanguagePerspective, 90 YALE L.J.
1149, 1150-51 (1981) (describing the disfavor into which treatise writing, and
even "mastery of any body of law," has fallen among legal academics).
215. Justice Linde makes the point forcefully:
Constitutional specialists ...

need to overcome the ingrained assump-

tions that constitutional law means the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, that for a national career, in a "national" law school,
professional scholarship means adding one more ream to each year's
paper mountain of commentary on those decisions, and that attention
to the constitutional law of a state, including the state where the law
school happens to be located, or to the treatment of one issue in several states, is for ambitious professors and law review editors a distinctly minor league game. These self-perpetuating biases are hard to
overcome.
Linde, supra note 21, at 936; see also, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Dis-
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for example, anyone who consulted Thomas Cooley's treatise on
state constitutional law 216-the best-selling law book of its
2 17
time, and widely cited by judges and practitioners alike would have found, at best, decisions from individual states used
to illustrate generic propositions of state constitutional law 218
and, at worst, Supreme Court decisions on federal constitutional law used to explain principles of state constitutional law,
with passing references to state court decisions added in the
2 9
manner of an afterthought. 1
course of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 770 (1992) (characterizing state constitutional discourse as "impoverished" relative to federal constitutional discourse).
216. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927) (1868). Cooley's
ConstitutionalLimitations first appeared in 1868 and was last published, as a
two-volume set, in 1927. See id. The last edition to be released in his lifetime
was the sixth edition, published in 1890, upon which the citations in this Article rely. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION (Alexis C. Angell ed., 6th ed. 1890) (1868) [hereinafter
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890)].
217. See Paul D. Carrington, Law as "The Common Thoughts of Men The
Law-Teaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L. REV. 495,
496-97 (1997); Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism" A Reconsideration,53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 759 (1967). In the words of
one contemporary reviewer, Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations was "not only
a standard authority, but almost exclusively sovereign in its sphere. It is cited
in every argument and opinion on the subjects of which it treats, and not only
is the book authoritative as a digest of the law, but its author's opinions are
regarded as almost conclusive." Carrington, supra, at 497 (quoting Book Note,
27 ALB. L.J. 300 (1883)); see also, e.g., Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in
HistoricalPerspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1059-60 &
1060 n.421 (1991) (noting state court acceptance of Cooley's views across a
range of nineteenth-century constitutional questions, and quoting Corwin's
description of Cooley's treatise as "the most influential treatise ever published
on American constitutional law"); Carrington, supra, at 528 & n.249 (canvassing the various left-wing criticisms attracted by right-wing judicial uses of
Cooley's treatise).
218. See, e.g., COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890), supra
note 216, at 192-214 (discussing the power of state courts to invalidate legislation); id. at 238-69 (discussing the plenary nature of state control over municipal governments); see also, e.g., THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180-87 (John Norton Pomeroy ed., 2d
ed. 1874) (reviewing decisions from four states, and concluding that courts
have "no right whatever" to invalidate legislation on the grounds of "natural
right, abstract justice, or sound morality").
219. In chapter 4, for example, Cooley discusses the weight to be given a
contemporaneous or long-accepted construction of a state constitution by dedicating several pages of description to a trio of Supreme Court decisions-
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It has been suggested that the tendency of constitutional
scholarship to favor federal over state law has more to do with
the incentives and desires of legal scholars than with any characteristic of the subject matter itself. 220 The suggestion is not
without merit: from a market perspective alone, doctrinal writing that purports to be comprehensive, and to synthesize the
law of many jurisdictions, is likely to have greater appeal to a
broader audience than scholarship that dwells upon the doctrinal niceties of one jurisdiction among many. It is doubtful
whether Thomas Cooley or Theodore Sedgwick 2 21 would have
enjoyed the same measure of commercial success or intellectual
influence had they confined themselves to the constitutional
law of Michigan or Massachusetts. Whatever the explanation,
the tendency of legal scholarship either to discuss state constitutional law in a totalizing way or to neglect it entirely has
hardly helped state courts to pursue unique constitutional approaches.
F. THE HOMOGENIZING TENDENCIES OF FEDERAL AND
SUPRANATIONAL STRUCTURES

A particular challenge is to unravel the complex and overlapping ways in which federal and supranational structures
foster constitutional homogenization. The most obvious path
that constitutional doctrine travels within such structures is a
vertical one, from top to bottom, as when federal or supranational law is formally binding upon state or national courts.
Unremarkably, British courts enforce E.U. law as announced
by the European Court of Justice and now must also apply the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 222 In
this country, the extent to which federal constitutional doctrine
protects a given right amounts to a floor beneath which state
constitutional law cannot fall-if not also a ceiling above which
223
it cannot rise.

Stuart v. Laird, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and Bank of United States v. Halstead-then citing in the text of the discussion only two state decisions, from
Massachusetts and Maryland, as confirmation of the point already made using
federal constitutional law. See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed.

1890), supra note 216, at 82-85.
220. See supra note 215 (quoting Justice Linde's criticism of the strong federal bias in contemporary constitutional scholarship).
221. SEDGWICK, supra note 218.
222. See supra note 37 (discussing the European Communities Act, 1972
and the Human Rights Act, 1998).
223. Federal constitutional rights may limit the content of state constitu-
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Of greater interest is the tendency of member states to
adopt federal or supranational doctrine in the absence of any
formal obligation to do so. It is in this context, after all, that
Justice Linde employed the term "generic constitutional law" to
criticize the indiscriminate adoption of federal constitutional
doctrine by state courts; 224 as James Gardner puts it, state
courts have "borrowed wholesale from federal constitutional
discourse, as though the language of federal constitutional law
were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument
generally." 225 Paul Kahn has argued that state and federal
courts are in fact partners in a common "interpretative enterprise" of "American constitutionalism," which "seeks to understand the appropriate role for the rule of law in a democratic
order."226 It is unclear, however, what makes such a lofty enterprise specifically American: few constitutional courts would
disagree that they seek to articulate "the appropriate role for
the rule of law in a democratic order." Kahn's "interpretive enterprise" might thus be treated as another interpretation of
Justice Breyer's mysterious "global legal enterprise."
The United Kingdom's history with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) illustrates a number of pressures toward conformity that supranational law can exert upon domestic jurisprudence. The United Kingdom was, in 1951, the first
country to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights
(Convention), 22 7 which included as one of its enforcement
mechanisms the establishment of the ECHR at Strasbourg. 228
Subsequently, the United Kingdom accepted the right of individual petition, which enabled individuals to sue the United
Kingdom in the ECHR for violations of the Convention. 229 At no
time, however, did the United Kingdom incorporate the Convention itself into domestic law. As a result, individual litigants
could win binding judgments against the United Kingdom in
Strasbourg but could not invoke the Convention in domestic

tional rights if the two happen to conflict. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) (holding that the state constitutional
right of picketers to enter a privately owned shopping center did not itself
amount to a violation of the Takings Clause).
224. Linde, supra note 21, at 942.
225. Gardner, supra note 215, at 766.
226. Kahn, supra note 108, at 1156.
227. See Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 93-94.
228. See European Convention, supra note 137, § II.
229. See Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 94-95.
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From that point, the United Kingdom proceeded to

compile the worst losing record of any nation before the
ECHR-a bitter irony for a country that had played a significant role in drafting the Convention. 23 1 Lord Browne-Wilkinson
spoke for many in expressing a combination of dismay and injured pride:
It is a most singular feature that the law of this country, which has
for so long prided itself on protecting individual freedom, has been
found to be in breach of the [Convention] on more occasions than any
other signatory.
It was those very freedoms enjoyed by us over the centuries which
were principal sources of the [Convention] itself. How can it be, then,
that our own system of law is unable to protect those freedoms which
232
in 1950 this country agreed to abide by in signing the [Convention]?

Some judges sought to salvage the situation by insisting-as
Lord Browne-Wilkinson did-that the principles found in the
Convention already existed in the common law:
It is now inconceivable that any court in this country would hold
that.., individual freedoms of a private person are any less extensive
than the basic human rights protected by the [Convention]. Whenever
[its provisions] ... have been raised before the courts, the judges have
asserted that the Convention confers no greater rights than those
protected by the common law.

232

230. See id. at 96-97.
231. See id. at 95-96 (describing "some sixty judgments" against the
United Kingdom in a wide variety of contexts); The Rt. Hon. Lord BrowneWilkinson, The Infiltrationof a Bill of Rights, 1992 PUB. L. 397, 398; WADE &
FORSYTH, supra note 37, at 183-85 & 183 n.11 (noting that the United Kingdom has been found in breach of "nearly all the Convention rights," and that,
by 1995, it had lost nearly half of its cases before the ECHR); see also BORK,
supra note 105, at 33 ("It is not clear why most of the [ECHR]'s decisions on
cultural matters appear to involve the United Kingdom."). But see Bringing
Rights Home, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2000, at 45-46 (calling Britain's record
before the ECHR an "international embarrassment," especially in light of the
British role in drafting the Convention, but stating, contrary to Lord BrowneWilkinson, that the United Kingdom "does not have the worst record on compliance").
232. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supranote 231, at 398, 404.
233. Id. at 405; see also, e.g., Laws, supra note 62, at 61 (arguing that the
contents of the Convention "largely represent legal norms or values which are
either already inherent in our law, or ... may be integrated into it"). A prominent decision that adopted this strategy was Derbyshire County Council v.
Times Newspapers Ltd., in which the House of Lords affirmed a decision by
the Court of Appeal that local authorities could not bring defamation actions:
whereas the Court of Appeal had relied upon the Convention's guarantee of
freedom of expression, Lord Keith emphasized that he relied exclusively upon
the English common law in reaching the same conclusion. See [1993] A.C. 534
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To the relief of many, Parliament enacted the Human
Rights Act, 1998, which incorporated the Convention into domestic law and directed the courts to give it effect, albeit within

limits.

234

Yet adoption of the Convention appears to have

heightened, not relieved, the harmonizing pressures of supranational law upon British constitutional law. Traditionally,
British courts have decided challenges to governmental action
under a highly deferential standard known as "Wednesbury unreasonableness, 235 which has been described by supporters and
critics alike as nothing more stringent than an "irrationality
test."2 36 By contrast, both the ECHR and the European Court of

(H.L.), 550-51 (speech of Lord Keith); see also, e.g., R. (Daly) v. Sec'y of State

for the Home Dep't, [2001] 2 A.C. 532, 545 (speech of Lord Bingham) (emphasizing that both the common law and the Convention guarantee the right of
prisoners to be present during examination of their legal correspondence);
CRAIG, supra note 60, at 552 (describing the "growing list" of uses to which
courts put the Convention); Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 96-97 (noting that
courts made use of the Convention and ECHR case law "as sources of principles or standards of public policy.., when common law or statutory law was
ambiguous, or where the common law was undeveloped or uncertain").
234. See, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 60, at 552-73; Lord Lester, supra note 37,
at 100-10. The Act does not empower the courts to strike down incompatible
parliamentary legislation, in light of concerns expressed by the judicial leadership that such a power would be inconsistent with parliamentary sovereignty
and thus unpalatable to many. See id. at 98; supra note 37 (discussing judicial
application of the Human Rights Act). For this reason and others, it has been
objected that the Act did not truly incorporate the Convention into domestic
law. See Marshall, supra note 37, at 108-14.
235. Wednesbury review, also known as Wednesbury unreasonableness or
the Wednesbury principle, derives its name from the decision in Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., in which Lord Greene
M.R. observed that British courts will overturn a governmental decision only if
it is "so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the
powers" of the decision maker. [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 229. In Lord Diplock's influential reformulation, Wednesbury unreasonableness "applies to a decision
which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards
that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question.., could
have arrived at it." R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind,
[1991] 1 A.C. 696, 765 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Lowry) (quoting Council of Civil
Serv. Unions v. Ministerfor the Civil Serv., [1985] A.C. 374, 410 (H.L.) (speech
of Lord Diplock)); see also supra note 48 (discussing Wednesbury review).
236. Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. at 757 (speech of Lord Ackner); see, e.g.,
ROBERTSON, supra note 48, at 238-39; SHAPIRO, supra note 104, at 111-24
(arguing that English courts do not, in practice, invalidate executive action by
the national government); Sir Stephen Sedley, The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law Without a Constitution, 110 LAW Q. REV. 270, 278 (1994) ("Far
from being the point at which public law woke up, the Wednesbury case is a
snore in its long sleep .. ").Lest it be suggested that the Wednesbury standard is insufficiently deferential to governmental decision makers, the House
of Lords has also enunciated what commentators have dubbed the "Super
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Justice (ECJ) apply proportionality review: the ECJ does so
when violations of E.U. law are alleged, 237 while the ECHR
does so in the context of Convention rights. 238 As a result, when
governmental action is alleged to violate both domestic law and
E.U. law or the Convention-as is often the case-U.K. courts
are required to apply both Wednesbury and proportionality
analyses to the same set of facts. 239 A number of British judges
have chafed against this arrangement and sought to incorporate proportionality review into domestic law. Some have argued that Wednesbury review can and should be stretched into
something resembling proportionality review; others have simply equated proportionality with Wednesbury review. 240 The
House of Lords and the ECHR have since foreclosed the latter
approach; both have indicated that proportionality review is
more stringent than Wednesbury review. 24 1 Disagreement
Wednesbury" test: where intricate questions of policy are involved, the courts
are to investigate the propriety of a decision "only if a prima facie case were to
be shown for holding that the [decision maker] had acted in bad faith, or for an
improper motive, or that the consequences of his guidance were so absurd that
he must have taken leave of his senses." ROBERTSON, supra note 48, at 260-61
(quoting Nottinghamshire County Council v. Sec'y of State for the Env't,
[1986] A.C. 240, 247 (speech of Lord Scarman)). But see, e.g., WADE &
FORSYTH, supra note 37, at 355-56, 364-66 (observing that, though the language of Wednesbury itself suggests that executive decision making "could almost never be found wanting,"... "the courts in deciding cases tend to lower
the threshold of unreasonableness to fit their more exacting ideas of administrative good behaviour"); Sir John Laws, The Limitations of Human Rights,
1998 PUB. L. 254, 262 (observing that Wednesbury review is not "monolithic"
and has been sharpened in cases involving human rights); infra notes 240-43
and accompanying text (describing efforts to elide Wednesbury and proportionality review in cases involving human rights).
237. See supra note 138.
238. See supra note 137.
239. See, e.g., R. v. Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte Int'l Trader's Ferry
Ltd., [1999] 2 A.C. 418, 429-40 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Slynn).
240. See R. v. Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte Int'l Trader's Ferry Ltd.,
[1998] Q.B. 477, 495 (C.A.), aff'd, [1999] 2 A.C. 418 (H.L.) (quoting Lord Hoffmann's observation that it is "not possible to see daylight" between the two
forms of review); WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 37, at 368-69. A third approach has been to argue that proportionality is different from Wednesbury
review, but has in fact been practiced by English judges. See Jowell & Lester,
supra note 133, at 59-69 (reviewing cases in which English judges have in
substance engaged in proportionality review, and arguing that '"ednesbury
camouflage" should be abandoned for the sake of the "legitimacy and integrity
of the judicial process").
241. See Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. at 748 (speech of Lord Bridge); id. at 750
(speech of Lord Roskill) (refusing to exclude the "possible future development"
of proportionality review as domestic law on a "case by case basis"); id. at 766
(speech of Lord Lowry) ("[T]here is no authority for saying that proportional-
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abounds, however, over both the extent of the disparity and the
pace at which it may be eliminated. 242 Lord Slynn, for example,
has made increasingly little effort to hide his own impatience:
There is a difference between [proportionality] and the approach of

the English courts [under Wednesbury]. But the difference in practice
is not as great as is sometimes supposed.. . . [E]ven without reference
to the Human Rights Act[,] the time has come to recognise that this
principle is part of English administrative law, not only when judges
are dealing with [E.U.] acts but also when they are dealing with acts
subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury principle and
proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing. Reference to the Human Rights Act ...makes it
necessary that the court should ask whether what is done is compatible with Convention rights. That will often require that the question
should be asked whether the principle of proportionality has been satisfied .... 243

The British experience, first with the Convention and now
with proportionality review, suggests several reasons to expect
the harmonization of domestic and supranational constitutional
ity... is part of the English common law and a great deal of authority the
other way."); Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 51,
92-96 (holding that Wednesbury review is less stringent than proportionality
and fails to constitute an "effective domestic remedy" for breaches of the Convention); see also Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 97 (discussing Brind and the
ECHR's response).
242. See, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 60, at 598-603 (arguing that proportionality is likely to be adopted as a matter of domestic law, in part because "the
Wednesbury test itself is moving closer to proportionality"); Laws, supra note
236, at 261-62 ("The extent to which the judges have already modified the
Wednesbury test.., has been more striking than is sometimes appreciated.");
Lord Irvine, supra note 37, at 231 (noting "much argument" over the status of
proportionality in domestic law, and the "undeniable" convergence of common
law principles of judicial review with "their continental cousins"). Compare,
e.g., Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. at 748-49, 751 (speeches of Lords Bridge and Templeman) (arguing that, in human rights cases, Wednesbury review merely requires courts to ask whether a "reasonable" official, "on the material before
him, could reasonably" conclude that the interference with rights was justifiable), and R. (Daly) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2001] 2 A.C. 532, 549
(H.L.) (speech of Lord Cooke) (deeming Wednesbury "an unfortunately retrogressive decision," and suggesting that English and European standards of
review may need to converge), with Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. at 764-67 (speech of
Lord Lowry) (quoting traditional, more restrictive formulations of Wednesbury
review, and criticizing the use of proportionality review as an arrogation of judicial power).
243. R. (Alconbury Devs. Ltd.) v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, Transp., & the
Regions, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, 320-21 (2001) (H.L.) (speech of Lord Slynn); see
also, e.g., Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte Int'l Traders Ferry Ltd., [1999] 2
A.C. 418 at 439 (speech of Lord Slynn); Daly, [2001] 2 A.C. at 547 (speech of
Lord Steyn) (arguing that "there is an overlap between the traditional grounds
of review and the approach of proportionality," and that "[m]ost cases would be
decided the same way whichever approach is adopted").
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law-the effect of shaming in the human rights context, the law
of the instrument, and the appeal of the simplicity that comes
with adoption of a single standard or approach. First, there can
be little doubt that the embarrassment of repeated losses in
Strasbourg encouraged Parliament to enact the Human Rights
Act.244 Had it not done so, judges might well have continued to
incorporate the Convention piecemeal into domestic law themselves, under the guise of articulating the common law 245 or
even E.U. law. 246 Moreover, the shaming effect was not simply

a consequence of domestic courts looking to other countries in
an ad hoc manner and arriving at some subjective impression
as to the underprotectiveness of British law. Rather, the United
Kingdom belonged voluntarily to a predefined reference group
of nations and faced a supranational scorekeeper in the form of
the ECHR: in other words, the United Kingdom was a laggard
by defined standards, relative to a peer group of its own choosing. Comparative shaming may be especially effective with respect to jurisdictions that pride themselves on a constitutional
tradition of freedom, a category into which the United States
and United Kingdom both fall. It is equally plausible, though,
that countries with less of a constitutional tradition, or a troubled past, would for that very reason be anxious to define constitutional rights aggressively and expansively; Schauer suggests South Africa as a possible example. 247 In either case,
244.

See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 37, at 182-83 (noting the "interna-

tional notoriety" attracted by British violations of the Convention, and the
constant criticism of the United Kingdom's failure to make the Convention
domestically enforceable); Bringing Rights Home, supra note 231, at 45 (noting that incorporation of the Convention will help the United Kingdom to
"avoid international embarrassment").
245. See supra note 233 (discussing Derbyshire County Council v.Times
Newspapers, Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534 (H.L.)).
246. Unlike the Convention, E.U. law has always been directly enforceable
by U.K. courts. The ECJ, in turn, is required to ensure that E.U. institutions
"respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the... Convention." TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 6(2), O.J. (C 325) 5 (2002) [hereinafter
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION]; see id. art. 46(d) (conferring jurisdiction upon

the ECJ over article 6(2)); see also, e.g., Case 17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone)
NV v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. 1-665, T 8-9, at 1-670-71 (E.C.J.); CRAIG & DE
BORCA, supra note 135, at 350-54 (discussing the possibility that the European Union itself may accede to the Convention); supra note 138 (discussing
article 52 of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights). Thus, regardless of the
Human Rights Act, U.K. courts could enforce the Convention in the areas
reached by E.U. law, on the grounds that the Convention is effectively a part
of E.U. law. See Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 231, at 401 (describing
E.U. law as a "backdoor" to incorporation of the Convention).
247. See Schauer, supra note 25, at 259.
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when it comes to the protection of rights and freedoms, no
country, or court, is likely to want the booby prize.
Second, the law of the instrument predicts the domestic
adoption of supranational constitutional standards. As Paul
Craig puts it, the repeated use of proportionality review, as required by E.U. law and now by the Human Rights Act, "will acclimatise our judiciary to the concept" and thereby encourage
its incorporation into domestic law as a "general standard of
review." 248 Even Lord Irvine, who as Lord Chancellor was responsible for introducing the Human Rights Act, expressed
doubt that the courts would continue to "restrict their review to
a narrow Wednesbury approach" once they became "used to inquiring more deeply in Convention cases." 24 9 To know and apply a legal standard, it seems, is to grow to like it.
A third reason to expect constitutional harmonization
might be called the "law of just one instrument": why use two
tools when one will do? Many judges would undoubtedly agree
with Lord Slynn that it is "unnecessary and confusing" for a
court to apply two standards of review to the same claim raised
under two parallel bodies of law. 250 To that confusion must be
added the further indignity that will result if U.K. judges find
themselves forced by their own Wednesbury standard to deny
rights claimed under U.K. law, only to uphold those same
rights under standards mandated by courts in France and Luxembourg. To date, British courts have been reluctant to concede
25 1
that their own law offers less protection than European law.

248. CRAIG, supra note 60, at 600.
249. Lord Irvine, supranote 37, at 234.
250. R. (Alconbury Devs. Ltd.) v. Env't Sec'y, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, 321 (2001)
(H.L.) (speech of Lord Slynn); see also, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 60, at 586 (observing that the Wednesbury test may "cease to operate as an independent test
in its own right," "in part because it will be increasingly difficult, or impractical, for courts to apply different tests to different allegations").
251. See, e.g., M. v. Home Office, [1992] Q.B. 270, 306-07 (C.A.) (speech of
Lord Donaldson) (calling it "anomalous" and "wrong in principle" that U.K.
courts have the power to issue injunctions against the government when E.U.
law has been violated, but not when U.K. law has been violated); Woolwich
Equitable Bldg. Soc'y v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1993] A.C. 70, 177 (speech
of Lord Goff) ("[A]t a time when Community law is becoming increasingly important, it would be strange if the right of the citizen to recover overpaid
[taxes] were to be more restricted under domestic law than it is under European law."); Lord Irvine, supra note 37, at 230-32 (discussing M. v. Home Office, Woolwich, and other cases).
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G. RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE AND DOCTRINAL RECURSION
Constitutional influences can be expected to percolate upward as well as downward. Thus, while incorporation of the
Convention into U.K. law exemplifies supranational influence
upon domestic constitutional law, the views of British courts on
the Convention can now, in turn, be expected to influence the
ECHR: as Lord Irvine humbly puts it, British judges "will bring
to the application of the Convention their great skills of analysis and interpretation" and "our proud British traditions of liberty."252 Perhaps this is merely to say that courts may lead by
example as well as by hierarchy, which is hardly a novel idea;
the very idea of persuasive authority presupposes as much. 253
A different kind of upward influence is evident when the
U.S. Supreme Court "constitutionalizes" state common law. For
example, the Court has employed state common law to fashion
hearsay exceptions under the Confrontation Clause, to define
property rights for purposes of the Takings Clause, and to govern review of punitive damage awards under the Due Process
Clause. 254 Alongside borrowing, the Court also practices headcounting: whether the question is one of "evolving standards of
decency" or the content of "ordered liberty," the Supreme Court
has been known to formulate federal constitutional doctrine on
the basis of a purported state consensus-the result of which is
to enforce the majority view upon outlier states. 255 These uses
of state law to define federal constitutional doctrine, when
combined with the tendency of state courts to treat federal constitutional doctrine as generic constitutional law, create a homogenizing feedback loop. The Supreme Court draws from
state law, then imposes its genericized version of state law back
upon the states in the form of federal constitutional law. But
state courts then treat what the Supreme Court has done as

252. Lord Irvine, supra note 37, at 235.
253. See Glenn, supra note 212, at 297 (describing the "perspective on law,"
prevalent outside the United States, that is characterized by resistance to "definitive statements of law" and openness to "persuasive authority from
abroad").
254. See Kaplan, supra note 21, passim.
255. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-73 (2003) (citing the
fact that Texas was among a small minority of states to punish same-sex sodomy as evidence of an "emerging recognition" of a protected liberty interest "in
matters pertaining to sex"); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321-22 (2002)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (objecting that there does not exist a "national
consensus" among the states against the execution of the mentally retarded).
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"generic constitutional law"25 6 -an ever-increasingly accurate
description-and incorporate it into state law. As federal and
state courts look to each other for guidance on a continual and
cumulative basis, the constitutional doctrine that is passed between them becomes increasingly generic.
Whereas the Supreme Court is not required to constitutionalize state law but does so as a matter of self-imposed interpretive strategy, 257 the ECJ is expressly obligated to fashion
generic constitutional law from the laws of twenty-five nations.
Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union requires the
European Union and its institutions to "respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention [on] Human
Rights... and as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law." 25 8 In practice, article 6(2) requires the ECJ to construct generic rights doctrine both from "constitutional traditions common to the Member States," and from the Convention,
which is itself an amalgamation of rights doctrine from an even
larger number of European nations. 259 If this provision were
not enough, the ECJ faces further pressure from national
courts to construct an overarching body of constitutional law
from that of the member states. National courts have proved
reluctant to embrace the supremacy of E.U. law, which is not
256. See Linde, supra note 21, at 942-45.
257. See Kaplan, supra note 21, at 464-69, 525-29.
258. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 6(2). Article 46(d) of the same
treaty confers jurisdiction upon the ECJ to enforce article 6(2) against E.U.
institutions. See id. art. 46(d); Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, 2000
9, at 1-670-71 (E.C.J.). The draft Constitution for Europe conE.C.R. 1-665,
tains a provision that parallels article 6(2). See Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochore, The EU and the Individual: FundamentalRights in the Draft Constitutional Theaty, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345, 354 (2004) (discussing article I7(3) of the draft constitution); supra note 138 (discussing the status of the proposed E.U. constitution).
259. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 6(2). The Council of Europe,
which predates the European Union and was responsible for promulgating the
European Convention on Human Rights, has a membership of forty-nine nations, forty-four of which have signed the Convention. See Council of Europe,
About the Council of Europe, at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/ (last
updated Jan. 2004). As of May 1, 2004, the European Union has twenty-five
member states, all of which happen to belong to the Council of Europe, though
there is no formal requirement that states must belong to the Council before
joining the European Union. See Europa: Gateway to the European Union,
The European Union at a Glance, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/indexen.htm
(last visited Oct. 8, 2004). The Council of Europe is independent of the European Union but can potentially be confused with the very similarly named
European Council, which is an E.U. institution.
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explicitly stated in any treaty but instead stands as an interpretive accomplishment on the part of the ECJ.260 In particular,
national courts have threatened to review E.U. law under standards of their own choosing unless the ECJ fashions and applies constitutional doctrine of its own. 2 61 For example, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht has warned that if the ECJ fails to
''generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental
rights," it will exercise its inalienable jurisdiction to test E.U.
law for consistency with Germany's own Grundgesetz. 262 That
is, the ECJ risks open judicial rebellion if it fails to discern,
then adopt as constitutional doctrine, the "essential content of
fundamental rights" throughout Europe.
The recursive doctrinal loop described earlier between federal and state law in the United States can be expected in the
European Union as well. For example, article 288 of the European Community Treaty renders the European Union liable in
damages for unlawful conduct by E.U. actors and requires the
ECJ to define the scope of this liability "in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member
States."263 As former Advocate-General Walter van Gerven has

260. See CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 135, at 278-79; Alan Dashwood,
The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European Community, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 355, 376-77 (2004). A
provision in the proposed Constitution for Europe would explicitly recognize
the "primacy" of E.U. law over national law. Id. at 379-80 (discussing article
10(1) of the draft constitution); see supra note 138 (discussing the status of the
proposed E.U. constitution).
261. As Advocate General Francis Jacobs has observed, the ECJ first recognized fundamental rights as a matter of E.U. law in the early 1970s "in response to pressure from national courts," in order to "reduce the risk of challenge to the primacy of [E.U.] law." Francis G. Jacobs, The Evolution of the
European Legal Order, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 303, 309 (2004). Since that
time, courts in Germany, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, and Greece have all "sent a
clear message that, unless the ECJ conducts serious constitutional review of
E.U. legislative and regulatory measures, national courts will have to review
them." George A. Bermann, Marbury v. Madison and European Union "Constitutional" Review, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 557, 562-63 (2004).
262. See Re Winsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), BverfGE 73, 339
(387) (F.R.G.), translated in [1987] (3) C.M.L.R. 225, 265; see also CRAIG & DE
BORCA, supra note 135, at 289-98, 319-26 (discussing the ECJ's many skirmishes with the German courts).
263. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 288, cl. 2, O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY] ("In the case of
non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance with the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.").

2005]

GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

observed, it is unrealistic to expect the ECJ to examine the sovereign liability doctrine of twenty-five nations (and counting)
and identify "general principles" that are truly common to all
yet provide some measure of actual guidance. 264 Instead, the
ECJ will inevitably use the language of article 288 as a pretext
to articulate principles that are sufficiently familiar in most
countries to gain acceptance. 265 The result is, of course, generic
constitutional law.
Member states, in turn, will be likely to adopt these generic rules. 266 Though the language of article 288 refers only to

E.U. actors, the ECJ has held in the Francovich case that
member states are liable in the same manner as E.U. institutions for violations of E.U. law. 267 The immediate result of

Francovich is to replace each member state's liability rules
with generic sovereign liability rules abstracted from the laws
of all the member states-at least to the extent that the mem-

ber state breaches E.U. law. 268 Insofar as the same conduct also

breaches the member state's own law, however, national liability will still be governed by national standards. 2 69 If the British
experience with Wednesbury and proportionality review is any
indication, national courts are unlikely to relish the application
of two sets of sovereign liability rules to the same act of governmental misconduct. The fact that one set of rules is ostensibly based on the other only makes their mutual existence seem
that much more unnecessary and confusing. As in the British
example, both the "law of the instrument" and the "law of just
one instrument" suggest that national judges will abandon
uniquely national doctrine. And, as in the American example,
264.

Walter van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common EuropeanLaw in the

Area of Tort Law: The EU Contribution, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 135-36 (Duncan Fairgrieve et al.
eds., 2002).
265. See id.
266. See Walter van Gerven, Non-contractual Liability of Member States,
Community Institutions and Individualsfor Breaches of Community Law with
a View to a Common Law for Europe, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 6, 36,
39-40 (1994) (arguing that national judges can and should not merely "harmonize" E.U. and national liability rules, but instead "merge them into a
common legal system").
267. See Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90,
1991 E.C.R. 1-5357,
31-35, at 1-5413-14 (holding that member state liability in damages for violation of E.U. law is "inherent in the system of the
Treaty").
268. See id.
269. See id.
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the result is a homogenizing feedback loop. First, article 288
obligates the ECJ to homogenize the sovereign liability laws of
the member states into a body of generic doctrine. 270 Second,
under Francovich,the ECJ imposes this generic doctrine upon
the member states in cases involving the violation of E.U.
law. 271 Third, national judges will incorporate the generic doctrine into domestic law. Finally, to complete the loop, the ECJ
will refine its already generic doctrine in light of newly homogenized national law, and produce doctrine that is even
more generic than before.
To generalize from the United States and European Union,
some form of homogenizing doctrinal recursion may be endemic
to federal and supranational legal structures that require state
(national) courts to apply federal (supranational) law. The
process begins when federal (supranational) courts fashion generic rules from state (national) materials, then impose those
rules upon state (national) courts as a matter of federal (supranational) law. Once forced to apply a generic rule on questions
of federal (supranational) law, state (national) courts find it attractive to adopt the generic rule for parallel questions of state
(national) law as well. Further use of state (national) law by
federal (supranational) courts to fashion federal (supranational) law both continues the expungement of impurities from
the generic doctrine and begins the process anew.
H. GENERIC DOCTRINE AS A REMEDY FOR LATERAL
JUDICIAL CONFLICT
Generic constitutional doctrine may be both a boon and a
necessity when supranational structures collide. The coexistence of the ECJ and ECHR raises the question of how coordination is to be achieved between two courts with overlapping
jurisdictions 272 but no formal hierarchical relationship. 273 The
270. See EC TREATY art. 288.
271. Francovich & Bonifaci, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357 at 1-5413-14.
272. See supra note 259 (describing the overlapping memberships of the
Council of Europe and the European Union).
273. The problems of disuniformity that are created when courts share territorial jurisdiction but lack formal hierarchy are not limited to supranational
courts. In France, for example, the Cour de Cassation sits atop the regular judiciary but lacks jurisdiction over questions of administrative law, on which
the Conseil d'Etat is supreme. See BROWN & BELL, supra note 60, at 21. Neither court, in turn, has the power to review the constitutionality of legislation,
which is the exclusive responsibility of the Conseil Constitutionnel. See id. at
14-22. These courts can neither reverse nor hear appeals from one another,
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emergence of generic European rights jurisprudence would
ameliorate the risk of conflict between the two courts, yet if
such generic jurisprudence is to emerge, both courts must coordinate upon its creation. As previously described, article 6(2) of
the Maastricht Treaty obligates the ECJ to enforce "fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention [on]
Human Rights," but does not specify that the ECJ must accept
the ECHR's interpretationsof the Convention. 274 The ECJ has
in practice sought to avoid conflict with decisions of the
ECHR,275 but disagreements have inevitably arisen. 276 Although the potential for conflict could be eliminated if the
European Union were simply to accede to the Convention, the
ECJ has held that the European Union currently lacks the legal power to do SO. 2 7 7 For its part, the ECHR has not always
made coexistence easy. In a trio of decisions culminating in
Vermeulen v. Belgium, 278 the ECHR held that a longstanding
although the Conseil Constitutionnel's decisions do have res judicata effect
upon other courts confronted with identical questions. See id. at 21, 21 n.20;
Bell, supra note 110, at 1759; Breyer, supra note 136, at 1058-60. At one
point, the Conseil d'Etat and Cour de Cassation held opposite positions on the
effect to be given E.U. law. The Conseil d'Etat took the position that it simply
could not consider the consistency of French legislation with E.U. law because
it lacked the power to review legislation, whereas the Court de Cassation held
the view that it could resolve conflicts between E.U. law and other legislation
because E.U. law had been incorporated into domestic law. Compare Syndicat
G~n~ral de Fabricants de Semoules de France, Judgment of Mar. 1, 1968,
Conseil d'Etat, Lebon 149, translated in [1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 395, 403-05 (submissions of Commissaire Questiaux), with Administration des Douanes v. Soci~t6 Cafes Jacques Vabre, Judgment of May 24, 1975, Cass. ch. mixte, D.
1975, 497, translatedin [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336, 363-64 (submissions of Procureur GindralTouffait). No doubt mindful of the "absurd practical consequences
for the citizen" that had been created by the two inconsistent lines of case law,
David Pollard, The Conseil d'Etat is European-Official,15 EURO. L. REv. 267,
273 (1990), and spurred by decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel indicating
an obligation to apply international treaties, the Conseil d'Etat eventually capitulated. See id. at 267-74 (discussing Raoul Georges Nicolo, Conseil d'Etat,
Oct. 20, 1989); CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 135, at 285-89.
274.

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 6(2).

275. See Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 231, at 401.
276. See CRAIG & DE BtRCA, supra note 135, at 367 (citing cases).
277. See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996
E.C.R. 1-1759, I 23-27, at 1-1787-89 ("No Treaty provision confers on the
Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights or
to conclude international conventions in this field."); CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra
note 135, at 351-54.
278. Vermeulen v. Belgium, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 224. The two previous
cases were Delcourt v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 5 (1970), and
Borgers v. Belgium, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1991).
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feature of Belgian judicial procedure violated the Convention
right to a fair trial by denying litigants the opportunity to respond to the opinion of the procureur gdndral's department,
which renders legal opinions to the Belgian courts and participates in their deliberations. 279 Needless to say, the ECJ itself
utilizes a procedure extremely similar to the one at issue in
Vermeulen.28 0 Confronted with Vermeulen, the ECJ satisfied itself, in an awkwardly reasoned decision, that its own procedures did not violate the Convention. 28 1 The very awkwardness
of its reasoning, however, is a touching testament to the ECJ's
desire to remain at least nominally faithful to ECHR jurisprudence-whatever embarrassment the ECHR may inflict upon it
in the process. In all likelihood, the ECJ has grasped that overlapping jurisdictions leave the two courts little practical choice
but to agree upon the content of constitutional rights doctrineeven if, in practice, one of the two must do most of the agreeing.

279.

See Vermeulen, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 234.

280. Compare Vermeulen, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 231-34 (describing the
Belgian Cour de Cassation's use of the procureurgindral), with Case 17/98,
11-15, at 1-671Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. 1-665,
72 (describing the ECJ's use of its Advocates-General). The EC Treaty itself
mandates the participation of Advocates-General in ECJ proceedings:
The Court of Justice shall be assisted by eight Advocates-General....
It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete
impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned
submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the
Court of Justice, require his involvement.
EC TREATY art. 222.

281. See Emesa Sugar, 2000 E.C.R. 1-665 passim; CRAIG & DE BfJRCA, supra note 135, at 368 ("Not all commentators are convinced by this judgment.... or by the assertion of compatibility with the [Convention] of the role
of the Advocate General in ECJ proceedings."). The ECJ attempted to distinguish its own procedure from the Belgian procedure in a few ways. It asserted,
for example, that unlike the Belgian procureurgdndral, the Advocate General
neither constituted nor represented a separate department of government;
rather, his authority stemmed directly from the court itself. See Emesa Sugar,
12, 14, at 1-671-72. It also suggested that the Advocate2000 E.C.R. 1-665,
General's opinion did not conclude the adversarial hearing portion of the proceedings, as in the Belgian case, but instead formed a part of the court's delib14-15, at 1-672. The ECJ could not, however, disguise the
erations. See id.
fact that its litigants are denied the opportunity to respond to the AdvocateGeneral's submissions-the very fact upon which the ECHR had rested its
holding in Vermeulen. See Vermeulen, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 234 ("[T]he fact
that it was impossible for Mr. Vermeulen to reply to [the procureurgindral's
submissions] before the end of the hearing infringed his right to adversarial
proceedings.").
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I.

THE ORGANIC OCCURRENCE OF GENERIC
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

Diversity in constitutional doctrine is in no danger of disappearing. Nor should we wish for its demise. Courts must
fashion and apply unique constitutional rules as circumstances
require. It is as unwise for judges to imitate slavishly as to be
contrarian for the sake of contrariness or to ignore the experience of other jurisdictions entirely. In an ideal world, judges
would earn their keep by determining in every case whether
borrowing is sensible or unwise. In many cases, that task is
likely to be impossible. It is difficult even to articulate a coherent set of criteria that might govern the adoption or rejection of
foreign examples. 28 2 The comparative study of public law is
plagued, if not defined, by fundamental disagreement over the
extent to which legal thinking can or should be transplanted
from elsewhere. Indeed, scholars cannot even agree over what
the theoretical alternatives happen to be. 283

It has been the contention of this Article, however, that generic constitutional doctrine develops and thrives for reasons
that presuppose little or no conscious coordination or agreement on the part of courts or judges as to the proper manner or
extent of doctrinal borrowing. As human decision makers faced
with complexity and uncertainty of both normative and factual
varieties, judges can be expected to gravitate toward the path
of least resistance, as defined by considerations of ease and
simplicity. In constitutional adjudication, the path of least resistance-intellectually, if not also practically-tends to be that
of homogeneity, not heterogeneity, for several reasons. First,
people minimize effort by making use of what is at hand; that
is, they obey the law of the instrument. Judges do so by copying

282. Cf. Ramsey, supra note 175, at 72 (arguing that American courts
should not use international materials to define domestic constitutional rights
absent a "fully articulated theory" that identifies both the materials to be used
and the manner of their use "in a way that can be applied consistently from
case to case," but declining to articulate such a theory).
283.

See,

e.g.,

MARY

ANN

GLENDON

ET

AL.,

COMPARATIVE

LEGAL

TRADITIONS 8-11 (2d ed. 1994); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 11-12, 15-31 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev.
ed. 1996) (stating, inter alia, that preparation for the "international unification of law" is among the functions and aims of comparative law); Choudhry,
supra note 28, passim (contrasting "universalist," "genealogical," and "dialogical" uses and justifications of comparative constitutional jurisprudence);
Tushnet, supra note 29, passim (describing "expressivist," "functionalist," and
"bricolage" approaches to comparative constitutional analysis).
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what other judges have done. In legal parlance, one might prefer to say, as David Strauss does, that the common law style of
constitutional adjudication values the existence of ready-made
solutions for their own sake. 28 4 Alternatively, one might say
that legal argument fails to reward, and sometimes even penalizes, originality. The underlying idea remains the same: courts
will tend to adopt doctrines employed by other courts simply
because they are available for adoption. This tendency will only
be encouraged to the extent that other courts offer an appealing
combination of experience, intellectual firepower, and prestige.
Second, there is a natural inertia to imitation: borrowing rewards further borrowing. Shared constitutional provisions and
historical lineages not only reflect past influence, but also beget
continuing influence. It is difficult even for skeptics of comparative analysis to dispute that courts may look abroad when asking "the same question about the same legal text or concept 2as
85
foreign courts or other institutions have previously asked."
Third, the prevalence of federal, supranational, and international law engenders legal complexity and conflict by requiring
courts to apply multiple sets of rules to the same dispute. When
jurisdictions overlap, generic doctrine becomes inherently attractive to courts because it both promotes analytical simplicity
and reduces the risk of conflict among judicial and legal systems. Federal and supranational structures, in particular, create strong incentives for courts to consult one another in selfreinforcing and even recursive ways. In such situations, doctrinal heterogeneity can only be maintained with effort-if it
can be maintained at all. Indeed, even in the absence of any
global supercourt capable of imposing common legal solutions,
the same dynamic has developed at the international level as
well. As Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet have observed, there
already exists an "upward-and-downward flow" between doto a
mestic and international human rights law that amounts
28 6
recursive doctrinal loop of the kind discussed above.
284. See Strauss, supra note 190, at 890-91 (observing that the "conventionalist" aspect of "common law constitutional interpretation"... "emphasizes the role of constitutional provisions in reducing unproductive controversy
by specifying ready-made solutions to problems that otherwise would be too
costly to resolve").
285. Hearingon H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 22 (statement of Michael D.
Ramsey) (emphasis omitted).
286. See Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction to DEFINING THE
FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at xiv-xv.
Though they do not speak of doctrinal recursion per se, what Jackson and
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CONCLUSION
It is one thing to suggest a new way of describing constitutional law; it is another thing to have a reason for doing so.
What is the point of generic constitutional law as an intellectual concept? Does it have any practical implications? Imagine
the following scenario. One day, instead of offering classes in
"Constitutional Law" and "Comparative Constitutional Law"the former implying the rigorous study of a defined body of law,
the latter implying comparison without a firm sense of purpose 2 7-law schools would instead offer classes in "Constitutionalism" and "American Constitutional Law." Such a minor
adjustment in nomenclature would denote a significant shift in
thinking about the very nature of constitutional law. Much as
first-year courses in contracts and property cover general principles of law without purporting to explain the law of every
state, courses in "constitutionalism" would cover the doctrines,
methods, and justifications commonly employed by judges in
reviewing governmental action. As things stand, "comparative
constitutional law" occupies an uncertain place in the American
law school curriculum; it is tolerated yet marginalized, 288 and
Tushnet describe is precisely this phenomenon at an international level: "some
aspects of international human rights law have developed initially by flowing
up from domestic legal systems into the international arena and then down to
domestic legal systems, sometimes even those systems that were sources for
the international human rights norms in the first place." Id. at xiv.
287. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 25, at 1-9 (questioning whether "Comparative Law" constitutes a "method" or a "technique," noting disagreement
over "what-if anything-Comparative Law is or should be as an academic
activity," and opining that the boundaries of the discipline "have been drawn
too widely"); Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160,
182 (2004) (condemning the current state of comparative legal instruction as a
"curricular mishmash, which favors the superficial, second-hand, and sketchy
sampling of a large number of legal systems, and more likely ends up confusing students than teaching them anything worth knowing").
288. Albeit from the not especially marginalized position of an endowed
professorship at Yale Law School, John Langbein offers these sad observations:
[L]aw school catalog descriptions of comparative law courses conceal a
curricular Potemkin Village. What you cannot know from a mere
reading of the catalogs is that virtually nobody-only a handful of
students-actually takes these courses. The vast majority of American law students graduate in complete ignorance of comparative law.
Thereupon they join the American legal profession, where they can
remain in blissful ignorance that the rest of the civilized world disdains many of the attributes of a legal system that Americans take for
granted.
Within the intellectual life of the American legal academy, comparative law is a peripheral field. Questions of comparative and for-
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perhaps not. without reason. If the notion of "comparative constitutional law," with its emphasis upon the activity of comparison, can be set aside, the study of how courts review governmental action might assume its place. Just as first-year
property courses do not gloss over the fact that states have different ways of registering title to land or dividing property
upon divorce, a law school course in constitutionalism need not
deny the fact of diversity in order to equip students with a
broad understanding of constitutional argument and reasoning-of what sorts of governmental actions are likely to be invalidated by judges, and how judges are likely to decide such
questions.
As a practical matter, the incentive already exists for law
schools to redefine their approach to constitutional pedagogy
along the lines suggested here. By way of analogy, selfconsciously "national" law schools teach the property law more
than one state because they aspire, for reasons both selfinterested and intellectual, to train lawyers who can and will
take lucrative or at least prestigious jobs in major cities nationwide. Similarly, as global legal practice becomes more
common, self-consciously "global" law schools will seek to enhance their stature and expand their markets by claiming that
they train lawyers capable of practicing both domestically and
globally. 28 9 The teaching of generic constitutional law-under
the more dignified name of constitutionalism or otherwise--

eign law seldom figure in the conversation about law and law-related
subjects that comprises the common intellectual life of an American
law faculty. Like a child in Victorian England, the comparativist on
an American law faculty is expected to be seen but not heard.
John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United
States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 546 (1995). The plight of comparative public
law, in particular, may be even worse than that of comparative law as a whole.
See John E. Finn & Donald P. Kommers, A Comparative Constitutional Law
Canon?, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 219, 226-27 (2000) (noting the "relative invisibility" in this country of the "international community of academics, judges
and lawyers that wrestles" with "transnational" constitutional problems);
Donald P. Kommers, Comparative Constitutional Law: Its Increasing Relevance, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 8, at 61 (deeming the release of VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999) an "important publishing event"
because it "represents a healthy shift from the overwhelming emphasis among
comparative legal scholars on private law").
289. See Valcke, supra note 287, at 169-70, 175, 182 (defining "noninstrumental global law teaching" as the training of "enlightened" lawyers capable of
thinking both domestically and globally, and noting the aspirations of many
law schools worldwide to provide such training).
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furthers such claims. The imperatives of growth and prestige
thus give law schools ample incentive to make generic constitutional law a viable scholarly project. Let us hope only that the
global law school of tomorrow does not forsake the study of national constitutional law the same way that the national law
school of today has forsaken the teaching of state constitutional
law.
But what of the normative questions posed by the idea of
generic constitutional law? This Article has argued that constitutional courts share similar theoretical concerns, analytical
methods, and substantive doctrine for reasons that are not entirely within their control. The question is, how far should they
take these similarities? Should American judges, in particular,
succumb to comparative constitutional analysis? To borrow or
not to borrow; that is the question.
Resistance to the influence of foreign case law is nothing
new. Following the Revolution, a number of states barred outright citation of English judicial decisions and even treatises. 290
Such a position would probably be unthinkable today: those
who have objected most vocally to the Court's uses of foreign
jurisprudence have also evinced an interpretive commitment to
originalism, which presupposes historical inquiry into the English legal backdrop against which the Constitution was
adopted. 29 1 With the benefit of two centuries of separation,
English jurisprudence and legal values, at least, no longer seem
especially threatening; nor, indeed, do we regard them as foreign, insofar as they have been adopted (or at least not disavowed) in this country. In reading the transcript of recent
congressional hearings on a resolution condemning the judicial
use of comparative legal materials, 292 however, it is difficult not
290. See GILMORE, supra note 19, at 22-23 (citing a New Jersey law enacted in 1799 which forbade citation of any English case decided after July 4,
1776, as well as "any [English] compilation, commentary, digest, lecture, treatise, or other explanation or exposition of the common law"); Glenn, supra note
212, at 277 (noting prohibitions imposed in the early 1800s by New Jersey,
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania on the use of English case law); ROSCOE POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 117 (1921) (same).

291. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. at 3 (2004) (allowing that courts
may consider the "judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions"
insofar as they "inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws
of the United States"); Hearingon H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 5 (statement
of Rep. Tom Feeney) (emphasizing that the "Reaffirming American Independence Resolution... doesn't prohibit any court from ever looking at foreign
laws as long as those laws inform an understanding of the original meaning").
292. See, e.g., Hearingon H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 1-4 (statement of
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to be reminded of the visceral fear of foreign influence that once
led states to prohibit judges from citing Blackstone's Commentaries. One might also wonder whether opposition to comparative constitutional analysis does not simply mask ideological
disagreement with particular decisions that happen to include
references to foreign materials. For example, though the Republican members of the Subcommittee make repeated and unfavorable references to Lawrence v. Texas 293 and Atkins v. Vir-

ginia,294 not one of them makes any mention of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg,295 which cites
Canadian case law, invokes a "norm among western democracies," and discusses the Dutch experience with euthanasia in
rejecting the existence of a constitutional right on the part of
the terminally ill to physician-assisted suicide. 296 Nor is
Glucksberg the exception to the rule: as Michael Ramsey observes, "in most historical examples the Court has used inter-

national materials to deny a proposed right."29 7 Indeed, he ar-

gues that "rigorous use" of international materials is inherently
298
likely to favor rights-constriction over rights-expansion.
Ramsey is profoundly skeptical, however, that the Court
has made, or will make, "rigorous use" of international materials. In his view, if international materials are to enjoy "a meaningful place in constitutional adjudication," judges must not use

Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution) (quoting the Declaration of Independence, and objecting that Americans "are not subject to the
dictates of one world government"); id. at 49 (testimony of Jeremy Rabkin)
(arguing that the European Union "is really set on undermining American
sovereignty"); supra note 16 (discussing the "Reaffirming American Independence Resolution").
293. 539 U.S 558 (2003) (striking down laws against same-sex sodomy).
294. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of the mentally retarded
constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
295. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
296. Id. at 710 n.8; see also id. at 734. The Glucksberg opinion cites the Canadian Supreme Court's opinion in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (1993), which itself canvasses the laws of Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and France. Glucksberg specifically quotes with approval the Canadian
court's conclusion that "a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.., is the
norm among western democracies." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710 n.8 (quoting
Rodriguez, [1993] 3 S.C.R. at 521).
297. Ramsey, supra note 175, at 72.
298. Id. at 81.
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them simply to engage in "opportunistic advocacy." 2 99 To that
end, he offers the following suggestions:
First, there must be a neutral theory as to which international materials are relevant and how they should be used. Second, we must be
willing to 'take the bitter with the sweet'-that is, to use international
materials evenhandedly to constrict domestic rights as well as to expand them. Third, we must get the facts right by engaging in rigorous
empirical inquiry about international practices rather than making
facile generalizations. And fourth, we must avoid easy shortcuts to international practice that rely on unrepresentative proxies such as
3 00
United Nations agencies.

Ramsey's guidelines raise a host of interrelated questions.
First, would it be desirable to implement them? In some cases,
the answer is clearly yes. It is difficult to argue that generalizations about foreign law should be facile, or that the United Nations is in fact a representative proxy for legal practice around
the world. Second, is it possible for judges to implement his
suggestions? For example, what if American lawyers and
judges are not capable of anything but "facile generalizations"
about international practice? What if they prove to be as amateurish at comparative legal analysis as they are at, say, history301 or economics 302? As difficult as these questions are, they
are also mercifully simple insofar as they might conceivably be
answered in an empirical way; other questions turn, however,
upon the notion of "neutrality," which amounts to an essen3 03
Is
tially contested concept in W.B. Gallie's sense of the term.
it possible to articulate a "neutral theory" of comparative
analysis--or, indeed, of any approach to constitutional adjudication? Indeed, what is a "neutral theory" in constitutional ad299.

Id.

300. Id. at 69-70.
301. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-11 (1996) (observing that originalism,
as a strategy of constitutional interpretation, is at odds with the professional
historian's attention to ambiguity and nuance, and criticizing the Supreme
Court's use of "originalist evidence" as "amix of 'law office history' and justificatory rhetoric"); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 155 (surveying the Court's long tradition of twisting
history to its own purposes, and assessing the results as "very poor indeed,"
from a "professional point of view").
302.

See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-65

(1987) (critiquing at length both the normative and empirical assumptions underlying "Chicago school" law and economics).
303. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 169 (1956) ("There are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless
disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.").
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judication? Does any ostensibly neutral theory face the same
suspicions and criticisms attracted by other ostensibly "neutral" methodologies such as textualism, or originalism, or law
and economics? Third, assuming that judges are capable of following Ramsey's suggestions, is it plausible that they will actually do so? Will either judges or the lawyers who appear before
them actually engage in "rigorous empirical inquiry" into foreign law? If it is somehow possible both to formulate and to apply a "neutral theory" of comparative analysis, will judges do so
faithfully? Finally, if implementation of Ramsey's suggestions
is unlikely or even impossible, what is to be done instead? What
is our theory of the second-best? If neutrality in adjudication
and skilled comparative analysis are beyond judicial reach, is
the answer to abandon the effort altogether, as Ramsey argues?3 0 4 Or does constitutional adjudication already consist of
"opportunistic advocacy," with or without a foreign flair? For
that matter, is there any kind of advocacy other than the opportunistic kind?
In arguing for adoption of a "neutral theory as to which international materials are relevant and how they should be
used,"30 5 Ramsey sets an impossible goal. He does so, moreover,
in response to a concern that is no way unique to comparative
constitutional analysis. According to Ramsey, having a neutral
theory-namely, one "that can be applied consistently from
case to case"-"confirms that we are not merely pursuing our
own moral preferences." 306 As he acknowledges, 30 7 this is the
same view that Herbert Wechsler took decades ago in his celebrated article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law. 308 The argument is that judges must decide constitutional
cases on the basis of "neutral principles" formulated without
regard to the result in any particular case, if they are to claim
that what they do rises above ordinary political decision making. 30 9 To be sure, one could keep worse intellectual company
than Herbert Wechsler. Unfortunately, Ramsey's rendition of
Wechsler's argument is open to the same objections as the

304.

See Ramsey, supra note 175, at 72.

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 72 n.18 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciples
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)).
308. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
309. See id. at 12, 15-16.
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original, and those are many.3 10 The principal objection goes
something like this. The Wechslerian argument envisions that
we begin with the "special values" embodied in the Constitution3 11 and extract from these values "neutral principles" which
are then used to decide cases. 312 This process requires, first,
identification of the relevant values; second, the extraction of
principles from those values; and third, the application of principles to facts, which will by definition be principled and therefore not result-oriented. At every step of this process, however,
substantive disagreement rears its ugly head-at the identification of values, at the extraction of principles, and at the application of principle to fact. The result can be called neutral
neither in theory nor in application. When people disagree over
what it means to be neutral, there can be no such thing as neutrality.
Ramsey does identify what he calls a "neutral principle"
implicit in the Court's recent decisions-namely, that international materials can be used either to defeat or (with greater
difficulty) to support "abstract claims" as to the "universality"
or "inevitable consequences" of particular constitutional
rules.3 13 This principle, he suggests, "would provide a defensi314
But does
ble basis for the use of international materials."
this principle exhaust the realm of neutral possibilities? For
the most part, Ramsey maintains, with Wechsler, that a neutral principle is simply one that is formulated without regard to
the result in any particular case. 3 15 If so, is there any use of international materials that could not be considered "principled"?
For example, may international comparisons be made for the
purpose of shaming judges to action? If, as a society, we aspire
310. Criticism of Wechsler's argument was quickly forthcoming even at the
time. See Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 passim (1960). More broadly,
Wechsler's argument places him squarely within the so-called Legal Process
school of thought, which has endured decades of criticism from critical legal
scholars and others without disappearing. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER O1F LEGAL LIBERALISM 34-37, 82-93 (1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introductionto The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at c-cxxxiv (William N.

Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
311. Wechsler, supra note 308, at 16-19.
312. Id. at 16.
313. Ramsey, supra note 175, at 75.
314. Id.
315. See id.
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to enjoy constitutional protections second to none, and to lead
other societies by positive example, is it not principled to pursue those goals by means of comparison? 316 Perhaps it is a
healthy pride that shames English judges into reading Convention principles into the common law; 3 17 perhaps it would reflect
a similar, widely shared pride in our own Constitution if our
judges were shamed into prohibiting the execution of juve3 18
niles.
At some points, Ramsey appears to equate "neutrality"
with "evenhandedness," as when he says that international materials must be used "evenhandedly to constrict domestic rights
as well as to expand them."319 But "neutrality," defined as this
sort of Solomonic evenhandedness, is then simply a preference
that international materials not be used in a way that favors
the expansion of rights. Shaming may be principled, but it is
not "neutral" if neutrality is defined in this manner. By its very
nature, shaming is a one-way ratchet: we may be shamed into
expanding constitutional protections, but it is difficult to see
how we could be shamed into contracting them. 320 It sounds
316. Cf. ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD
VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 193 (2001) (lauding groups such as Human Rights
Watch for their deliberate use of shame, and clinging to the hope that 'lying
deep within the American soul is the desire to provide leadership and moral
ideals").
317. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing Derbyshire
County Council v. Times Newspapers, Ltd.).
318. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
319. Ramsey, supra note 175, at 70.
320. Insofar as modern liberal democracies tend to celebrate the very notion of rights, see, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN
DE SIPCLE] 333-35 (1997) (noting the ubiquity of "rights talk" in "Western"
democracies), shaming should favor the expansion of rights: in a political culture that exalts rights, "other countries respect this right, so we should too" is
a more appealing argument than "other countries don't respect this right, so
we shouldn't either." To be sure, some may find particular rights a source of
consternation and wish for that reason to curtail them. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989)
(observing that the Second Amendment is "profoundly embarrassing to many"
who otherwise consider themselves "zealous adheren[ts] to the Bill of Rights");
Schauer, supra note 25, at 258 (noting that the United States "is seen as representing an extreme position" in the constitutional protection of hate speech).
The very appeal of rights talk, however, makes it inherently difficult to depict
rights as shameful, much less to criticize one's country as overprotective of
rights. The more palatable approach is to argue that certain rights are observed at the undue expense of other rights-such as abortion rights at the expense of fetal rights, or hate speech rights at the expense of the equality and
dignity rights of minority members. Another plausible approach-displayed by
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neutral to say that we must either follow the lead of other
countries faithfully, or not follow their lead at all. But what is
really neutral about opposing the idea that constitutional comparisons should only be performed for the limited purpose of
shaming? Does neutrality require that we fetishize consistency
with other countries for its own sake? Either we must adopt a
substantive position in order to give "neutrality" meaning-in
which case we are no longer "neutral"-or neutrality means
nothing at all.
The use of foreign legal materials does raise a legitimate
concern, but the true nature of this concern emerges only if all
pretense of neutrality is dropped from constitutional argument.
As a means of interpreting the Constitution, comparative legal
analysis may well be irreducibly non-neutral or prone to opportunistic use-but so is any other ostensibly neutral approach to
constitutional adjudication that might be imagined. The real
question is, does comparative analysis pose any special risk of
abuse not posed by other approaches? Is foreign or international law a uniquely harmful or dangerous source of persuasive authority in constitutional adjudication, as compared to
other sources? Is the siren song of foreign authority so alluring
that it renders American judges incapable of judgment, such
that its use should be prohibited? Judges draw upon a variety
of sources in deciding cases-not merely (or even frequently)
from the case law of the Canadian Supreme Court, but also
322 and microeconomics, 323
from treatises, 321 and dictionaries,
American legal elites toward the Second Amendment-is simply to ignore or
"marginalize" the right in question, Levinson, supra, at 640, without resorting
to the argument that it is unpopular elsewhere. See id. at 639-42 (describing
the active indifference of constitutional scholars to the Second Amendment).
321. For example, a LexisNexis search of Supreme Court decisions for
"Hart & Wechsler"-as
WECHSLER'S THE

in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM

(5th ed.

2003)-turns up no less than seventy-seven cases in which this casebook and
its precursor editions appear. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31-32 &
31 n.6, 34 n.7 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680, 694 (1993); id. at 719, 721 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Similarly, a search for "Tribe, American Constitutional Law"-as in
TRIBE, cited above in note 34, and earlier editions-yields sixty-two results.
322. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using Webster's Second New InternationalDictionary (1950) to define
the term "representatives" as it appears in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act);
Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 passim (1998).
323.

See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS passim (1970) (guaranteeing himself at least one judicial
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and studies of how children play with dolls, 324 and public opinion polls, 325 and the kind of historical research that actual his-

torians deride as "law office history,"326 to name a few of the
more obvious culprits. By what right do judges allow any of
these sources to influence the interpretation of the Constitution
and laws of the United States?
The indisputable answer is the tautological one: it is acceptable for judges to use that which is acceptable, whereas it
is unacceptable for judges to use anything that is unacceptable.
To be more precise, the authority of judges to use any sourcedomestic or foreign, legal or nonlegal-always rests upon the
same considerations: first, the legal community's internal standards of what constitutes persuasive argument, and second, the
accountability of judges to a wider audience.
A. THE LEGAL COMMUNITY'S INTERNAL STANDARDS
OF PERSUASIVENESS

To some extent, this check upon what constitutes persuasive constitutional argument is circular: insofar as the Supreme
Court has the final word on what constitutes a winning constitutional argument, it is within the power of the Supreme Court
to remake the standards of acceptable argument. Justice
Breyer can make it acceptable to cite international case law
simply by doing so repeatedly, if only because he has onefifth 3 27 of the final say over what constitutes a winning constitutional argument in this country. Nor is he in the minority on

adherent); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW passim (6th ed.
2002) (same).
324. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing re-

search by Kenneth and Mamie Clark on the preference of black children for
white dolls); MICHAEL COLE & SHEILA R. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CHILDREN 398 (3d ed. 1996) (reviewing scientific debate over the Clark studies); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 315-36, 573-74, 705-07, 718-22 (Vin-

tage Books 1977) (discussing Kenneth Clark's influence on the Brown litigation and decision).
325. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (arguing
that "polling data shows a widespread consensus among Americans, even
those who support the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is
wrong"); id. at 325-37 & app. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (producing the raw
polling data on this very question, and raising a variety of methodological objections to the majority's use of the data).
326. E.g., RAKOVE, supra note 301, at 11 (quoting yet another historian,
Leonard Levy); Kelly, supra note 301, at 132.
327. It is fitting to say one-fifth, not one-ninth, because decision making by
the Court requires the agreement of only five Justices.
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the relevance of foreign case law. No prudent advocate can ignore the numbers-namely, that there are nine Justices, and
328
that the number six is greater than the number three.
On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent judges who
disagree with any particular approach from fighting back. And
they do. There is no enforceable code of conduct in constitutional argument-or, for that matter, in intellectual argument-that excludes the use of any particular authority. There
is only what David Mamet calls "the Chicago way."329 Mamet is

the author of the line delivered by Sean Connery's character,
crusty Irish cop Jim Malone, to Kevin Costner's Eliot Ness, on
how to deal with Al Capone, in the 1987 film version of The Untouchables: "He pulls a knife, you pull a gun. He sends one of
yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. That's
the Chicago way."330 Thus, Justice Breyer cites the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe, and Justice Thomas publicly ridicules him
for doing so. 33 1 That, too, is "the Chicago way." Both sides of the

debate would be foolish not to use all the authority and rhetorical weaponry at their disposal, subject to their own calculations
that the persuasive benefits from doing so will outweigh the
losses inflicted by the other side in response. 332 That is all the
328. See Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I'd Love To Talk With You, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at 43 (counting six members of the current CourtChief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg and
Breyer-who have in recent years "referred, in limited ways, to foreign or international legal sources"); supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (describing the current division on the Court). Whatever lingering doubts advocates
may harbor as to the practical value of comparative arguments, Justice Breyer
has done his best to dispel them:
Neither I nor my law clerks can easily find relevant comparative material on our own. The lawyers must do the basic work, finding, analyzing, and referring us to, that material. I know there is a chicken
and egg problem. The lawyers will do so only if they believe the courts
are receptive. By now, however, it should be clear that the chicken
has broken out of the egg. The demand is there.
Breyer, supra note 4.
329.

THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).

330. Id. The Court itself has been known to champion the "Chicago way" on
occasion. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
(invalidating hate speech ordinance on First Amendment grounds) ("St. Paul
has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules.").
331. See supra note 10 (describing exchanges between Justices Scalia and
Thomas, on the one hand, and Justice Breyer, on the other, in the death penalty context).
332. Judge Posner's account of how judges use authority comports with the
account of constitutional argument offered here, though he is more inclined to
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restraint that constitutional adjudication requires-or, indeed,
permits, given that there is no appeal from the Supreme Court.
A judge who is willing to resort to international materials enjoys no unfair advantage over colleagues disinclined to do the
same. The use of such materials does not render him immune
from criticism, or have a chilling effect on his critics, or shock
the opposition into silence. If anything, the opposite is true.
Any victory won by opponents of comparative constitutional argument may, however, be Pyrrhic. Insofar as their goal
is simply to prevent judges from cloaking arguments in the
prestige and authority of other courts or jurisdictions, 333 anticomparativists may well succeed. Criticism may dissuade
judges from citing foreign jurisdictions openly. But no amount
of criticism is likely to prevent judges from plagiarizing covertly. There is no effective way to distinguish in substance between the decision of a judge who has arrived independently at
what he believes to be a reasonable and appropriate approach,
and that of a judge who has silently considered the approaches
adopted by other jurisdictions and selected what he believes to
be the most reasonable and appropriate of them. Nor have the
critics of comparativism mounted any convincing argument
that judges must fashion constitutional doctrine that is wholly
original and unique to this country. It is one thing to object to
imitation for the sake of imitation; it is another thing to object
to adoption of an intrinsically sensible approach simply because
it has already been adopted elsewhere. The result may ultimately be to invite subterfuge on the part of comparisonminded judges.3 34
criticize than to accept what he sees. In his words, the citing of foreign case
law
is one more form of judicial fig-leafing, of which we have enough already.... In-depth research for a judicial opinion is usually conducted after rather than before the judges have voted, albeit tentatively, on the outcome. Citing foreign decisions is probably best
understood as an effort, whether or not 'conscious, to further mystify
the adjudicative process and disguise the political decisions that are
the core, though not the entirety, of the Supreme Court's output.
Posner, supra note 27, at 42.
333. See id. at 41 (criticizing the use of foreign case law as "authority" or
"precedent," but not as a source of "persuasive reasoning").
334. The risk that judges will resort to covert borrowing in the face of resistance to explicit comparative analysis is more than hypothetical. Edward
McWhinney relates the example of Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ivan
Rand, a Harvard Law School graduate who discovered that other members of
the court were resistant to the notion of emulating American approaches to
constitutional questions. Rand ultimately succeeded in adopting a number of
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B. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO A WIDER AUDIENCE

It is an open secret that judges are accountable for the
quality and nature of their arguments not just to one another,
but also to the rest of us. The idea of judicial independence is
something of a sacred cow, even though the judiciary in this
country is not independent of political forces and has never
been-not since the Jeffersonians sought to rescind the appointment of a federal magistrate named Marbury. By comparison, the very notions of judicial accountability and responsibility are regarded with distrust; they conjure up unhappy
images of judges criticized or pressured into resigning, or even
threatened with impeachment for unpopular decisions. 335 But
judicial accountability and political influence over the judiciary
are as much a part of the constitutional order as judicial independence. To dwell upon judicial independence without mention of judicial accountability is to harp upon the separation of
powers without regard to the fact that the Constitution also establishes checks and balances. The power of the President to
nominate federal judges, and the Senate's powers of advice and
consent, are mechanisms that ensure the composition of the
bench reflects the dominant forces of American political life.3 36

It has been nearly fifty years since Robert Dahl observed that
those approaches for the court-in part by failing to acknowledge their American origins. See Edward McWhinney, JudicialReview in a Federal and Plural
Society: The Supreme Court of Canada, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS,
supra note 105, at 63, 69-70.
335. A disquieting example is that of Clinton district court appointee Harold Baer, who was threatened by Republican congressional leaders with impeachment over an evidentiary ruling in a drug case, United States v. Bayless,
913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), which Judge Baer subsequently recanted,
921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Clinton White House contributed to the
furor by insinuating that it would request Judge Baer's resignation if he did
not reverse himself. See Jon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80
JUDICATURE 156 passim (1997); Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism, WASH. POST., Sept. 14, 1997, at Al; Ann Devroy & John M.
Goshko, President Answers GOP, Other Critics on Judiciary, WASH. POST.,
Apr. 3, 1996, at A2. Another prominent example is that of the attempt made
by House Republicans to impeach Justice William 0. Douglas, ostensibly for
the offense of publishing excerpts from his book in a magazine that featured
sexually explicit material. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 182 n.11 (2002).
Gerald Ford, then House Minority Leader, led the effort and declared at the
time that "an impeachable offense is anything a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history." Id.
336. See David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner'sDilemma, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 479, 498-500 (2005); supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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the members of the Supreme Court are replaced with such
regularity "that the policy views dominant on the Court are
never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among
the
the lawmaking majorities of the United States."3 37 He-and
33 8
-still
political scientists who have followed in his footsteps
await a strong empirical rebuttal.3 39 And they shall continue to
wait, for the last five decades have been kind, on the whole, to
Dahl's argument. Who, today, is prepared to argue that the
ideological balance of the bench does not reflect an ongoing
struggle between political actors who have sought to tip it one
way or the other?
It is the premise of so much constitutional theory that we
cannot accept judicial review unless we believe in the inde340
pendence of judicial decision making from political influence.
That premise is questionable. As reasons to accept judicial review go, judicial independence may be overrated, while judicial
v.
accountability may be underrated. 341 In this post-Bush 343
Gore,342 post-Roe v. Wade-then-PlannedParenthood v. Casey,
337. Dahl, supra note 34, at 285.
338. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Road Taken: Robert A. Dahl's DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme' Court as a National Policy-Maker, 50
EMORY L.J. 613 passim (2001) (discussing the intellectual legacy of Dahl's article); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 6870 (1989) (same); supra note 112 (discussing the work of Dahl, Rosenberg,
Barrow, et al., and others).
339. This is not to suggest that Dahl's line of argument has escaped critical
empirical evaluation. See Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 passim (1976). Casper takes
Dahl to task for using the invalidation of federal legislation as his sole measure of the extent to which the Court has followed (or resisted) the prevailing
lawmaking majority, to the exclusion of cases involving statutory construction
or the constitutionality of state laws. See id. at 56-60. Nevertheless, Casper
deems much of the extended evidence inconclusive and concludes that, "[iun
some areas, the pattern Dahl suggests does seem apposite: unpopular decisions become part of the country's political agenda, and changes in political
regimes affected recruitment to the Court." Id. at 59.
340. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1571-73 (1988) (observing that "several generations of
political theorists and academic lawyers" have struggled to reconcile "democratic premises" with the notion that "an independent judiciary, unco-opted by
the political aims of the ruling majority and willing to defend individuals'
rights against government abuse, seems crucial to liberal democracy"-then
attempting the same task).
341. Cf. Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 629-31 (1996) (arguing that "if the
public is to continue to grant authority to the courts, it will be on the basis of
decisional independence accompaniedby accountability").
342. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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post-Bowers-then-Lawrence344 age, in which presidential candidates openly campaign on the composition of the Supreme
Court, and circuit and even district court nominees face defeat
on ideological grounds, 345 it cannot be assumed that people
think judges are even capable of political neutrality. Yet no
widescale repudiation of judicial review appears to be forthcoming. It did not take the National Guard to enforce any of these
decisions 34 6-not even the one that decided a presidential election against a majority of actual voters. No one has proposed a
new Court-packing plan. 347 Why so? The indisputable answer

is, again, the tautological one: the Court has not in recent decades sufficiently antagonized enough people, for long enough, to
provoke such extreme reactions. That it has not done so, however, may have something to do with the fact that political actors have paid careful attention to the views of those they appoint, such that the views represented on the bench reflect the
political forces of the day (and those of the recent past).348 Per-

haps the time has come to celebrate, not criticize, the scrutiny
given to judicial nominees. A newfound popular appreciation of
the extent to which political forces determine both the composition of the bench and the direction of constitutional adjudication may actually imbue judges with some measure of the democratic legitimacy that they so often claim to lack. 349 The fact
that the judiciary is subject to political control-even if only in343. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
344. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
345. See Law, supra note 336.
346. See KLUGER, supra note 324, at 753-54 (noting President Eisenhower's reluctance to deploy troops to Little Rock in the wake of Brown v.

Board of Education).
347. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 124, 155 (2000) (discussing

President Franklin Roosevelt's infamous proposal to increase the membership
of the Court to overcome its resistance to the New Deal).
348. See Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 805-07 (1975) (confirming Dahl's hypothesis that,
"during periods of electoral and partisan realignment," there exists a "lag period" owing to the life tenure of the Justices during which time the Court is
more likely than usual to be "out of line" with the lawmaking majority).
349. Judge Posner has made a similar claim, without invoking the empirical research on the extent and regularity of judicial turnover and replacement.
See Posner, supra note 27, at 42 (observing that direct and indirect popular
controls over the selection of state and federal judges imbues them with "a certain democratic legitimacy" lacking in foreign judges).
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directly and with some lag-is a respectable reason to tolerate
the judicial invalidation of statutes.
The fact of accountability means that, when constitutional
questions arise, we have good reason to prefer that they be decided by a federal judge in Saint Louis than by a multinational
panel of judges in Strasbourg. Though we may not like to dwell
upon the power that we enjoy over our independent judges, it is
simply the case that the judge in Saint Louis is more accountable to us for the exercise of her power than any number of
judges in Strasbourg. Through our representatives, we determine her appointment, her replacement, and even, in the extreme, her impeachment. The marriage of power to accountability is again a respectable reason, free of xenophobia or
nativism, to submit to a judge in Saint Louis, but not to a judge
in Strasbourg. For our judge in Saint Louis merely to cite a
judge in Strasbourg, however, does not diminish her responsibility to us for what she does. In citing foreign case law, she relinquishes to Strasbourg neither the power to interpret the
Constitution nor responsibility for the decision reached. International legal materials do not apply themselves to domestic
legal disputes. Neither, for that matter, do dictionaries, or the
Federalist Papers, or microeconomic concepts. A judge is responsible for her own choice and use of persuasive authorities;
the burden and responsibility of judgment remain inalienably
her own.

